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ABSTRACT
From the end of the Second World War to the mid 1970's Canada experienced a 
dramatic expansion of post-secondary education. A number of environmental pressures 
precipitated the involvement of the federal government, in what is constitutionally a 
provincial jurisdiction.
This thesis examines the issue of federal involvement in post-secondary education 
in Canada. It begins with a review of the approaches and theoretical frameworks for 
studying public policy. It continues with an analysis o f the institutions of federalism, 
executive federalism and intergovernmental relations and their effect on policy outcomes.
The third chapter examines the Iiistoric growth o f federal involvement and highlights 
the major turning points in both federal provincial relations and fiscal relations that were 
precipitated in the post-secondary education sector.
The focus then shifts to the policy community surrounding this at the federal level. 
Individual societal and government actors are examined and their capacity to affect policy 
is assessed. A brief discussion of the federal state's capacity and autonomy to act concludes 
the body of the thesis.
Federalism in Canada has limited the federal government's actions in this area 
because o f the provincial jurisdiction, yet it has been flexible enough to allow pragmatic 
solutions to problems that arise due to fiscal imbalances within the constitution. The 
increase o f provincial power importance o f fiscal relations and the corresponding conflict 
that they engender have both contributed to the federal government disengaging itself from
Yv
iii
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this area of provincial jurisdiction. This disengagement began to a degree in 1967 with 
shared-cost programs, continued through the 1977 EPF Agreements, and subsequent 
amendments in 1982,84, 86 and freezing of rates to 1995. The latest federal budget, is a 
further step in this direction. Federal involvement in this sector resulted from post-war 
centralization, the decrease in federal involvement is following the swing of the pendulum 
towards decentralization.
IV
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IN T R O D U C TIO N
From the mid 1940's (with the return of veterans from the Second World War) to the 
1970's Canada experienced an unprecedented education explosion. Pressures came from 
population growth, and the increased need for technology created by industrialization and 
urbanization, along with a changing occupational structure. Education as a field of public 
policy became more significant as a result o f these pressures. It has been suggested that 
education is the sector in which the provinces have maintained their greatest autonomy from 
the federal government. This is less so for the area o f post-secondary education, where 
federal funding has played a key role beginning with direct payments in 1951.
Although the Constitution places education within the jurisdiction of the provinces 
in Canada, the federal government has ventured into the post-secondary sector of this 
jurisdiction almost from the start. Education is a vitally important component of any 
society's growth and development, and the federal government through research and 
development, retraining initiatives and funding has played a role in post-secondary education 
for many years.
This thesis will examine the issue of federal involvement in post-secondary education 
policy in Canada, and whether or not there is an increased role for the federal government 
to play. While the term post-secondary education is used, in fact the thesis deals with 
university education. Although the most significant change in post-secondary education has 
been the establishment and growth of community colleges, time and space constraints have 
limited the discussion to the university sector.
This thesis begins with a review of approaches to policy analysis in Canada, and of
1
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theoretical frameworks that would enable a comprehensive and effective review of how a 
policy sector is developed. Richard Simeon's seminal 1976 article1 will be the overall 
framework within which the paper will be examined, with emphasis on the environment and 
institutions. Since the 19S0's there has been an increased interest among political scientists 
in both the study of interest groups, and the concept of bringing the state back into policy 
analysis. Coleman and Skogstad's2 model o f policy community and policy network will be 
examined as well as Atkinson and Coleman's3 analysis o f state capacity and autonomy.
The second chapter examines the institutional framework in which policy decisions 
are made in Canada. The importance of federalism in Canadian policy making, and the rise 
of executive federalism cannot be underestimated in their impact on policy making.
Chapter three examines the growth o f federal involvement in the field of post­
secondary education and highlights the major turning points in federal-provincial relations 
and fiscal federalism that were precipitated in the post-secondary education sector. Federal- 
provincial conflict has been a persistent factor in many o f the interactions concerning fiscal 
relations, which are the underpinnings o f federal involvement in this area. This chapter also 
describes the relationship developed between the major actors in the field.
The final chapter focuses on the policy community surrounding the post-secondary
'Richard Simeon, "Studying Public Policy", Canadian Journal of Political Science. 
(9:4, December 1976).
2William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in 
Canada. (Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1990).
3Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral 
Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies," British Journal of Political Science, 
v. 19.
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education sector at the federal level. It looks at the individual actors and assesses their 
capacity to affect policy. It ends with a brief discussion of state capacity and state autonomy 
to act and assesses the federal government's capacity and autonomy to act.
In the conclusion of the thesis I will wrap up the arguments presented in the body. 
I will discuss the federal-provincial tensions in the field, along with the calls for a stronger 
centralized position on post-secondary education. Examination of the issue of funding, and 
the decreasing cash portion o f Established Program Financing (EPF), and its impact upon 
the federal role in post-secondary education will be summarized. The leverage provided by 
cash transfers, already weakening under EPF, is further eroded by the Canada Health and 
Social Transfer and will affect the federal government's ability and capacity to develop 
policies and maintain a presence in the post-secondary education sector. Finally the attitude 
of past and current federal governments towards a federal role will be examined which will 
assist us in reaching conclusions regarding the dilemma Canadian policy regarding post­
secondary education.
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C H A P T E R I 
T H E  STU D Y  O F  PU B LIC  PO L IC Y
As the scope of government intervention has increased, especially since the Second 
World War, state action has become more complex and difficult to understand. As a result, 
the study of public policy in Canada has been an expanding field within the discipline of 
political science for several decades. One of the most succinct definitions of public policy 
is the much quoted one o f Thomas Dye, who stated that public policy is "whatever 
governments choose to do or not to do."1 Policy therefore involves a conscious choice that 
leads to a deliberate action or inaction. This definition views policy narrowly, as a series of 
isolated decisions. Policy making is more fully understood as the outcome of a long series 
o f more or less related activities and their consequences."2 Political scientists study public 
policy to better understand politics, and attempts to answer the questions: What does
government do? How does it do it? and, What consequences will its decisions have on 
society?
There are many different theoretical models and approaches to explain decision­
making, how public policy frameworks are developed, and why governments act or fail to
Thom as Dye, Understanding Public Policv.(3rd. edition), (Prentice-Hall, Englewoood 
Hills, New Jersey, 1978), p.3.
2Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas, Canadian Public Administration. Problematical
Perspectives. (Prentice-Hall, Sca~borough, 1987), p. 192.
4
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act on a particular problem or issue.3 There is no universally accepted theory of policy 
study, and each model directs attention to different features o f the political system. For our 
purposes, we will use the models chosen by authors Robert J. Jackson and Doreen Jackson 
to organize our discussion.4 They divide their theories into two categories: micro-level and 
macro-level approaches.
Micro-level approaches such as incrementalism and rationalism are intended to 
explain how individual decisions are taken within a broad framework of public policy. 
Approaches which focus on decision-making assume governmental priorities and objectives 
have been established and therefore they do not take into account societal forces in the 
policy-making process.
Macro-level approaches deal with broader patterns o f public policy that are a result 
of the relationship between the state and society. The theories in this category differ in the 
weight they grant to economic, social and political factors with regard to policy outputs, as 
well as in their view of the interests served by the state or government in its policy decisions. 
In the following pages we will briefly discuss four different approaches to policy analysis 
including: environmental determinism, pluralism, public choice, and neo-Marxism.
Environmental determinism, sometimes labelled the sociological approach, 
attempts to relate public policy outputs (such as public expenditure) with various 
environmental factors. This approach tends to downplay the importance of individuals and
3For a brief but inclusive survey o f authors and theories see Stephen Brooks, Public 
Policy in Canada. (McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1989), pp. 39-63, esp. pp. 41-46.
4Robert J. Jackson, and Doreen Jackson, Politics in Canada. Culture. Institutions. 
Behaviour and Public Policy. (Prentice Hall Canada Inc., Scarborough, 1990), pp. 585-200.
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group actors (parties and interest groups), and political variables such as ideology or the 
distribution o f power. Public policy is designed to maintain equilibrium between the 
political system and its environment.
The theoretical origins of environmental determinism can be found in the systems- 
analysis framework of the 1950's which viewed the political system as a sub-system of 
society. One such model was designed by David Easton who believed that by viewing each 
of the factors o f political life in a piecemeal fashion we can attempt to understand it. While 
asserting that political scientists can study institutions such as political parties, interest 
groups, and government and such political practices as manipulation, propaganda and 
violence, Easton was more interested in the structure within which these practices occur. He 
insisted that no one part can be fully understood without attention to the whole. Political life 
was a system of interrelated activities, all o f which influenced the way in which authoritative 
decisions are formulated and executed within a society.5
Easton illustrated his theory using the now familiar diagram o f a political system 
complete with inputs, demands, the "black box" or political system, and outputs providing 
feedback, all working within an environment. Inputs are converted by the process o f the 
system into outputs and these in turn have consequences within the system and for the 
environment in which the system exists.6 Easton was concerned with the causal relationship 
between the inputs and outputs o f the system. However, even if a strong relationship exists 
between socio-economic and other environmental factors and policy outputs, causality is
sDavid Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis o f  Political Systems," World Politics, v. 
9, April 1957, p. 383-384.
6Ibid„ 384.
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extremely difficult to prove. Environmental factors are important in understanding the
policy process but there are many other variables which must also be considered.
Pluralism as a model o f politics has dominated North American political science
for most o f this century. Unlike environmental determinism, pluralism stresses individual
or group actors in the political process, and sees the political system as
a dynamic mass o f activity in which new groups constantly evolve and old 
ones are killed off as society adjusts to change. ... In the process o f 
maintaining equilibrium ... society will naturally produce groups to champion 
an interest disadvantaged by a recent change in social and economic 
conditions. The same dynamic forces will ensure that there will always be 
challengers to groups that seek to dominate policy-making.7
Politics is viewed as a process where individuals and groups seek to promote their
interests through organization, political mobilization and alliance building on different issues
in order to influence policy outputs. Power and control do not rest solely with the
government but are in fact "widely distributed".8 Pluralists believe that competition leads
to  equilibrium and that "[pjluralist equilibrium is really the public interest."9 The
government's role in this competition is to act as a neutral referee, adjudicating competing
demands and implementing and enforcing public policies in the national interest or, at least
according to the wishes o f a majority on each issue. Public policy is seen as the outcome of
this competition between groups and parties. The pluralist vision o f widely dispersed power
7APaul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy. (2nd. ed.) (Toronto, Oxford University 
Press, 1992), p. 230.
8Theodore Lowi, The End o f Liberalism. Ideology. Policy, and the Crisis of Public 
Authority. (W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1969), p. 44.
9Ibid., p. 47.
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based on the equality of access to the policy process is frequently criticized.10 Some groups 
face obstacles to getting their interests heard and put on the agenda, and some lack 
the political and economic resources to do so. A wide array o f groups do organize and 
attempt to influence policy makers. It is necessary to examine their effect on public policy, 
especially in a liberal democracy where government must respond to pressures ifom society.
Public choice theory assumes that individuals are essentially self-interested, rational, 
utility-maximizing actors, who seek to maximize their own interests in a system constrained 
by scarcity and competition. As in pluralism the central actors in policy making are special 
interest groups, bureaucrats and politicians. Unlike pluralism however, the primary unit is 
the individual not the group. Individuals join forces when collective action promises greater 
rewards. Also, in contrast to pluralism, public choice theorists see no reason to believe that 
pressure from different groups is balanced or fair. Finally, public choice sees government 
as a complex process o f interaction and bargaining among bureaucrats and politicians 
seeking to maximize their own self interest.
Public choice theory has developed from a long established tradition of classical 
economic theory. However, as an approach for policy analysis it is relatively 
underdeveloped, as it provides only a partial aid towards understanding how and why 
policies are made. It does provide an interesting contrast to environmental determinism and 
pluralism in its recognition that politicians and bureaucrats are not just servants o f external 
pressures, but have their own interests and objectives. Yet, Bruce Doem and Richard Phidd, 
for instance, believe that it lacks a sufficient recognition of the broader relations among
I0See Theodore Lowi, The End o f Liberalism, especially chapter 10.
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institutions and among ideas, structures and processes.11 Stephen Brooks questions whether 
public choice is as scientific an approach as its adherents would have us believe. He points 
out that the theory is not free from ideological preferences. It is aimed at "determining what 
kinds o f institutional arrangements and constitutional arrangements work better for citizens". 
Who determines what is "better"? Is it simply policy defined as least costly, or involving the 
least interference from government?12
In the post-secondary education policy field, public choice theory would be an 
inadequate and extremely difficult theory to pursue. Since our intent is to examine the 
federal role in post-secondary education, the extreme diversity o f the federal government 
involvement alone makes this difficult. This does not include the myriad of other actions 
in this field. It is also difficult to see actions taken by government in terms of individuals 
and their own self interest, as there is no mammoth bureaucratic whole to preserve. Federal 
involvement is scattered throughout a number o f departments as diverse as the Secretary of 
State and the Department o f Indian Affairs.
While public choice theory applies liberal economic concepts to the study of politics, 
the neo-Marxist approach provides an alternative political economy approach. Neo-Marxist 
theory seeks to develop a systematic conceptualization of politics and the role of the state 
in capitalist society based on the assumption of the relationship between economic, societal 
and political structures. Social and political relations are determined or constrained by the
UG. Bruce Doem and Richard W. Phidd. Canadian Public Policy. Ideas Structure 
Process. (Nelson Canada, Scarborough, 1992), p. 10.
12Stephen Brooks, Public Policy in Canada. (2nd. edition)(McClelland and Stewart, 
Toronto, 1993), pp. 38-39.
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economic basis o f society.
The "state" is composed of a complex array of institutions, including the government,
bureaucracy, militaiy, judiciary, and representative assemblies as well as sub-central
(provincial) executives, legislatures, bureaucracies and municipal government institutions;
The primary role o f the capitalist state is to
fulfill two basic and often mutually contradictory functions —accumulation 
and legitimation ... the state must try to maintain or create the conditions in 
which profitable capital accumulation is possible. ... [T]he state also must try 
to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that 
openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the 
expense o f other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis 
o f its loyalty and support.13
Neo-Marxist analysis o f why the state acts as it does is divided between two 
outlooks. Instrumentalists believe the state acts in the interests o f the capitalist class because 
o f a similarity in background, family ties and school networks among the political and 
bureaucratic elites and the business community. Structuralists, like Leo Panitch for instance, 
argue that the capitalist class has competing factions within it, and that the state must be 
relatively autonomous of the dominant class to serve the long term interest o f capitalism 
rather than the short term interests o f individual capitalists.14 Policy makers do not
'V-V
consciously ask themselves how they can preserve the capitalist system, according to neo- 
Marxists, because within the dominant liberal ideology the "national interest" coincides with
13The Fiscal Crisis o f the State. (New York, 1973), p. 6 as quoted in Leo Panitch, "The 
Role and Nature o f the Canadian State", in Leo Panitch (ed.), The Canadian State: Political 
Economy and Political Power. University o f Toronto Press, (1977), pp.3-27, p.8.
14Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature o f the Canadian State", in Leo Panitch (ed.), The 
Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power. (University o f Toronto Press, 
Toronto, 1977), pp. 3-27, p. 8.
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the general interests o f capitalism.15
Neo-Marxist analysis is oriented towards matters of inequality and the distribution 
of power within society. As such it can be seen to account for broad patterns in public 
policy; however, it remains unclear how the state makes specific policy choices or decisions.
In the 1970's Richard Simeon developed a broad and useful framework for policy 
analysis in which he assumes that the political machinery and policy makers operate within 
a framework which "greatly restricts the alternatives they consider and the range of 
innovations they make".16 This framework defines a set o f problems considered to be 
important, a set of acceptable solutions or policy responses, and a set of procedures and rules 
by which they will be considered. The framework is composed of five characteristics or 
general approaches. Policy can be studied as a consequence o f the environment, of the 
distribution of power, of prevailing ideas, of the institutional framework and of the process 
o f decision making. While the characteristics can sometimes be conflicting, they are more 
often seen as complimentary.17
Like environmental determinism, Simeon suggests that patterns o f policy making 
may be explained by reference to environmental factors such as demography, wealth, 
industrialization etc. Simeon recognizes that the environment is an important starting point 
for analysis as it defines problems and also limits the resources to deal with them, yet it has 
limited capacity to explain policy outputs.
15Brooks, Public Policy, p. 42.
l6Richard Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science. (9:4, 
December 1976), p. 555.
17Loc cit.
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The distribution of interests and resources across society will be reflected in the 
pattern of policy. Policy is a result of the number of interests involved, the level of 
disagreement or conflict among them, and the means of influence which each interest is able 
to bring to bear in the policy process.18
Policy can also be seen as a function o f the dominant ideas, values, theories and 
beliefs o f a society. To focus on ideas, one needs to consider both culture and ideology. 
Culture is the basic orientation to a political system, political activity, or conflict. Ideology 
deals more explicitly with politically focused ideas which explain the political world, and 
provides a framework for interpreting particular events.19
Simeon's fourth approach to policy analysis concentrates on institutional structure, 
the workings of the political system. This includes the way government is organized, the 
structure of the decision-making process, the degree o f centralization, the way authority is 
shared or the formal mechanisms for registering decisions.
The institution o f federalism, and the corresponding division of powers permeates 
most policy areas in Canada. Simeon asserts that federalism does have clear policy 
consequences, as it can structure how we see problems. While institutions themselves have 
no particular policy content, the way in which they interact with other social forces,
18Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," p. 568.
19Simeon's discussion of ideology includes such things as procedural norms such as 
decision making rules, ie. majority rule, proportionality; along with substantive norms such 
as what governments should do, the level of appropriate government intervention. 
Additionally it includes elite and mass values, deferential attitudes to authority and the level 
o f homogeneity and heterogeneity within a society, and the ideological dimensions o f left 
and right when deciding what the general goals o f government should be. See Simeon, 
"Studying Public Policy", p. 570-73.
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favouring some interests and strategies over others, certainly influences policy.
Policy process is closely linked with institutions. It is through decision makers such 
as bureaucrats, politicians and interest group leaders that the broader political forces operate. 
Decision makers reflect the pressures o f the environment, the political influences 
surrounding policy disputes, the norms, assumptions and values found in the culture and the 
ideology and the opportunities and constraints imposed by the institutions.20 Simeon closes 
his article with a discussion o f the role o f  the politician and bureaucrat in the policy process. 
While environmentalists would consider these roles to be minimal, advocates of process 
would place more emphasis on the political role. Simeon's approach emphasizes the 
framework within which the process operates. Process is crucial, Simeon argued: it is the 
impact point of the other variables.
Simeon's framework can be examined at three levels. At the macro level are the 
socio-economic environmental factors, which are more general and are the farthest removed 
from the policy process. The environment is shaped by and helps to shape the other factors. 
The meso-level o f analysis focuses on the system of power relations, dominant ideas and 
values of the society and the structure o f political institutions. These factors have an impact 
on, and in turn are affected by environmental factors. Micro-level analysis involves the 
policy process. The policy process has some independent effect on policy outcomes, but it 
also reflects and is shaped by the broader factors in the framework. Each characteristic holds 
some capacity to explain patterns o f policy, but, neither one offers a full understanding of
20Simeon, "Studying Public Policy", p.576.
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policy decisions. All three levels are important, together forming a "funnel of causality"21 
where the level of relative importance in determining the actual policy outputs increases as 
the funnel narrows.
As suggested above no single approach to policy analysis has been accepted by those 
studying public policy. But using Simeon's framework we can analyse the different 
approaches. Each focus on different aspects o f the "funnel". Public choice models, similar 
to micro level analysis, are more concerned with decision making within government than 
with the interaction between government and the socio-economic environment, or with 
broader questions of the distribution of power, ideas and institutions. Environmental 
determinists attempted to link public policy outputs with aggregate economic and social 
variables, ignoring the distributional questions and the decision process.
The neo-Marxist and pluralist models integrate more o f the elements of the funnel. 
The neo-Marxists address the influence of economic and social environment as they link the 
role o f the state to changes in the social structure and the economy which result from the 
ongoing development o f the capitalist mode o f production. Inequalities o f power, income 
and resources among social classes and the role of ideology and values supportive of 
capitalism in the process of legitimation are central themes in neo-Marxist analysis. 
Advocates of this system o f analysis have not come to terms with the independent influence 
o f actors within the policy process in determining public policy outcomes.
Pluralists take into account the socio-economic environment, since our increasingly 
complex society gives rise to more and more issues and interests around which groups
2lSimeon, "Studying Public Policy", p. 556.
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mobilize. While stressing the interaction of interest groups within the policy-making 
process, they also stress the mediating effects o f institutions such as the electoral process.
The traditional view of pluralism fails to recognize inequalities of power and 
influence, and emphasizes government as a reactive agent, which responds only to the 
balance of group pressures. Recent contributions have attempted to come to terms with these 
difficulties. Today, many authors in the pluralist tradition acknowledge that the modem state 
is a dynamic actor in the policy process, and in fact recognize the "autonomy" of the state, 
and that it is not merely a referee o f group demands.
It is within this pluralist approach that we will be examining the policy of post­
secondary education in Canada. We will make a closer examination of the newer strains 
emerging within pluralism, including the attempts to bring the state back in as a variable in 
policy analysis. First we will examine the study of the interaction o f interest groups within 
the policy making process as discussed by Paul Pross.22 We will move on to the study of 
policy communities and networks,23 which opens into a discussion of state autonomy and 
capacity24. Our final discussion will take us into the burgeoning field o f neo-institutionalism 
and its effect on policy process as espoused by Michael Atkinson.25
22A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy. (2nd ed.) (Oxford University Press, 
Toronto, 1993).
^William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in 
Canada. (Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., Mississauga, 1990), p. viii.
24William Coleman and Michael Atkinson, "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral 
Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies", British Journal o f Political Science. 
(v.19, 1989).
25Michael Atkinson, Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy. (Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Canada Inc., Toronto, 1993).
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A Theoretical Framework for Policy Analysis in the Post-secondary Education Sector
Prior to the 1960’s, according to Paul Pross, pressure groups in Canada were not 
prominent actors in the policy process. As interest groups became more active in the public 
debate, they became more important as a factor to be studied by political scientists. As a 
result the focus of public policy analysis in the decade of the 1980's shifted increasingly to 
the study o f interest or pressure groups within the political system in Canada.26 The focus 
o f study on these groups has expanded from a concentration on the political influence of 
groups to include the role these groups play in the policy process.
According to Paul Pross, interest groups are "organizations whose members act 
together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest."27 As such 
they try to persuade governments to pursue policies which they favour. In so doing, interest 
groups perform a number o f essential functions within a political system. They provide a 
vehicle for drawing people together who have common interests and through their process 
of discussion allow these people to articulate their interests, and how they should be handled, 
to government.28
The proliferation o f groups within the Canadian system gives support to the theory
26For a historical overview o f Canadian writings on this subject see Henry J. Jacek, 
"Public Policy Analysis and the Impact o f Interest Groups: The Contributions of Canadian 
Political Scientists", QSEP Research Report No. 274, presented to the 1991 annual meeting 
o f the Canadian Political Science Association, Kingston, pp.2-6.
27A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy. (2nd ed.), p. 3.
28Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, p.87; see also Henry J. Jacek, "Public Policy 
Analysis and the Impact o f Interest Groups: The Contributions o f Canadian Political 
Scientists", Paper presented to the Annual Meeting o f Canadian Political Science 
Association, June 4,1991 Kingston, p .l.
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that Canada is a liberal-democratic society. According to Paul Pross this pluralist view sees
pressure groups competing with other groups within the system for a say in how the power
of the state is to be used to benefit each of them through the provision of programs. As this
relationship is obviously one of power, pressure groups must be examined from the
perspective o f their relationship with the state.29 Grant Jordan refers to this as "the
institutionalization of relations among governmental and non-governmental actors".30 Jordan
goes on to assert that policy communities are the key to understanding the vast bulk of policy
making in settled Western type political systems. This is of primary importance to
understanding the policy process because
policy making is fragmented into sub-systems... it is the relationships 
involved in committees, the policy community o f  departments and 
groups...that perhaps better account for policy outcomes than do 
examinations o f party stances, o f manifestos or o f parliamentary influence.31
Pross emphasizes the functions and structure o f interest groups as well as their position in
and importance to the policy community. He also examines how groups interact with
government and the effects o f interest group involvement on democracy.
The proliferation of special interest groups, and their rise in prominence in the policy
process and their impact on government in general has opened an entirely new field of study
for students o f public administration and public policy since the early 1980's. Explanations
29A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy. (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 
1986,) p. 108.
30Grant Jordan, Policy Community Realism versus "New" Institutionalist Ambiguity," 
paper presented at ECPR, Joint Sessions, Bochum 1990, p .l.
3lTbid., p. 3. Jordan is quoting an earlier work by J J .  Richardson and himself Governing 
Under Pressure (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1979). Emphasis in original.
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for group formation include the recognition that many groups were formed or extended their 
activities to place demands on government. These groups were concerned with allocational 
demands, or public resources being distributed in ways that serve the interests of their 
members. Examples of such groups include groups representing the poor and trade 
associations. Many other groups have formed in an attempt to direct the regulatory functions 
o f the state, for instance, consumer association groups or environmental groups. Other 
explanations include etatisme where the state is progenitor in fostering intervention and the 
formation of interest groups, through bureaucratic patronage. Other groups are fostered by 
the government, this is not due to patronage but because society demands that certain groups 
should not be excluded from the policy process.32
Interest promotion is a subsystemic function, that groups perform, according to Pross, 
one that assists those already in the subsystem. Interest groups therefore must attempt to 
justify this self-interest to the political community at large by performing functions that are 
useful to the system as a whole. They must, he states, "offer services needed by their host 
political system, receiving in return specific benefits for themselves and their members."33
Pross identifies four other functions under the term ' systemic functions' that interest 
groups perform, that meet the needs o f the community. Of the four, communication and 
legitimation are the more important. Less important are regulation o f their members on 
behalf o f the stale and assistance in program administration.
In the late 1980's the study o f political science saw a convergence in research focus
32A. Paul Pross, "Governing under pressure: the special interest groups - summary o f 
discussion." Canadian Public Administration 25:2 (Summer 1982), p. 172.
33M L , p.88.
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on two previously distinct subfields: interest group studies and public policy analysis. 
Interest group research included traditional concerns about political influence, but also 
included different roles groups could assume in the policy process and the implications these 
differences might have for group structure.34 Studies o f  public policy gave prominence to 
organized interests in the policy formation process and the politics o f policy implementation. 
The role o f organized interests and their relations with particular bureaus emerged as a 
crucial component in policy studies where researchers have integrated some of the insights 
o f the interest group subfield.
In their book Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada, William Coleman 
and Grace Skogstad provide a framework for policy analysis that focuses on the actions and 
capacities o f both state and societal actors in a given sector, and on the relationships that 
exist among them. Analysis takes place at the meso or sectoral level, which requires 
isolating relevant or pertinent sectors o f the state. This approach also permits differences 
in state capacity and autonomy to be considered as relevant, along with the organizational 
development o f interests across sectors.35
Diversity in state-society relations is common across sectors within the same nation­
state. This has led to increased interest in desegregating the state in search o f concepts to 
help understand diversity of arrangements at the sectoral level. Two concepts o f interest are 
policy community, and policy network.
For Coleman and Skogstad a policy community includes
34WiIliam Coleman and Grace Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in 
Canada. (Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., Mississauga, 1990), p. viii.
35Coleman and Skogstad, Policy Communities, p. xi.
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all actors or potential actors with a direct or indirect interest in a policy area, 
or function who share a common "policy focus" and who, with varying 
degrees of influence shape policy outcomes over the long run.36
Policy communities are divided into sub-governments, which include government agencies,
inteiest associations and societal organizations which all help to make policy, and the
attentive public which varies depending on the field of policy. The attentive public follow
and attempt to influence policy decisions, but they do not participate in them.
Policy networks are reserved for describing the properties that characterize the
relationships among particular sets o f actors that form around an issue of importance to the
policy community.37 Policy communities and networks must not overshadow the dynamics
of the policy process involved. Communities are institutions in themselves and become
integrated by developing a shared set of values, norms and beliefs which shape the policy
networks that emerge and ultimately the policy outcomes.38
Coleman and Skogstad’s analysis also includes the development of a new
conceptualization o f state strength. They distinguish between state autonomy to act in a
policy field and state capacity to act. They point out that an autonomous state is not
necessarily a policy-capable state, nor is a state with financial, jurisdictional and
bureaucratic capability to execute its own goals and programs necessarily willing to do so.39
State actors who are independent o f societal groups when they formulate policy
36Coleman and Skogstad. Policy Communities, p. 25.
37Ibid.
38Coleman and Skogstad, Policy Communities, p. 29.
39William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in 
Canada. (Copp Clark Pitman, Mississauga, 1990), p. 6.
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objectives indicate a high degree o f autonomy. The ability of state actors to control access 
by others to the policy network and through this to control the policy agenda is an important 
indicator o f state autonomy. The ability to control access and agenda also illustrates a state 
actor's autonomy from actors in other departments (such as the department of finance) from 
entering the policy network and seizing control of its agenda. This will be central to our 
examination o f post-secondary education policy as the recent restructuring of the 
government by the Liberals, and the current fixation with fiscal restraint have resulted in 
changes to the federal government's role in post-secondary education. Using control over 
access and agenda as indicators o f sectoral state autonomy, we can highlight the close 
relationship between the strength o f the state and the strength o f organized interests. 
Coleman and Skogstad argue that sectoral state actors are more able to control agendas from 
both private interests and other public actors, when they enjoy the support o f well organized 
societal interests.40
In an autonomous state the goals o f the state such as the identification of problems 
and alternative policy responses to these problems, are internally generated, and do not 
merely reflect societal interests or demands. Atkinson and Coleman suggest some features 
o f bureaucratic agencies and staff that would enhance state autonomy41
The capacity of a state to act depends on its ability to design and implement policies 
that meet its objectives. Capacity, like autonomy, is greatly affected by the skill of
40Ibid., p. 6.
41This point will be elaborated in a later chapter in this thesis, see Michael Atkinson and 
William Coleman, "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced 
Capitalist Economies." British Journal o f Political Science fv.19. 1989), p. 52.
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bureaucratic officials. Plentiful resources are also important as is the ability to coordinate
or concentrate the actions of participants in the policy process. State capacity to coordinate
policy is enhanced when a single agency or bureau dominates a given sector.-12
State capacity and autonomy may not occur together. On the one hand, a state
agency may have sufficient autonomy to define its own policy goals but lack the capacity
to design policy instruments or implement policy in the face o f stiff societal opposition. On
the other hand capable state actors may devise policy initiatives whose successful
implementation necessitates accommodating sectoral interests.
According to James March and Johan Olsen, in current theories of politics, traditional
political institutions such as the legislature, the legal system and the state have receded in
importance from the position they held in earlier theories. They are viewed merely as arenas
within which political behaviour occurs. This is changing however as they point out that
institutional perspectives have reappeared, as a consequence o f the transformation of social
institutions which have become larger, more complex and resourceful and therefore more
important to collective life.43 There is a blending o f elements o f  the old institutionalism into
some of the recent neo-institutionalist theories.
Attention to institutions never disappeared from the study of political science
entirely, but was superseded by a conception o f political life that was non-institutional.
The vision that has characterized theories o f politics since about 1950 is (1) 
contextual, inclined to see politics as an integral part o f society, less inclined 
to differentiate the polity from the rest o f society; (2) reductionist, inclined
42Coleman and Skogstad, Policy Communities, p. 16-17.
43James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational 
Basis o f Politics. (The Free Press, New York, 1989). p. 1.
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to see political phenomena as the aggregate consequences o f individual 
behaviour, less inclined to ascribe the outcomes of politics to organizational 
structures and rules of appropriate behaviour; (3) utilitarian, inclined to see 
action as stemming from calculated self-interest, less inclined to see action 
as a response to obligations and duties; (4) instrumentalist, inclined to define 
decision making and the allocation o f resources as the central concerns of 
political life, less attentive to the ways in which political life is organized 
around the development o f meaning through symbols, rituals, and 
ceremonies; and (5) functionalist, inclined to see history as an efficient 
mechanism for reaching uniquely appropriate equilibria, and less concerned 
with the possibilities for maladaptation and nonuniqueness in historical 
development.44
March and Olsen explore ways in which the institutions o f politics provide order and 
influence change in politics. They are concerned with interpreting political institutions as 
fundamental features o f politics and with understanding the ways in which they contribute 
to stability and change in political life. Without denying the importance o f both the societal 
context o f politics and the motives o f individual actors, they believe institutional analysis 
posits a more independent role for political institutions.45
Michael Atkinson also addresses the effect institutions have on public policy. 
Continuing in the same vein as Richard Simeon, Atkinson looks at three interpretations o f 
public policy based on; ideas, interests, and institutions. A focus on political ideas such as 
equality, freedom, rights and authority are at the heart o f policy disputes. Exploring the 
beliefs o f Canadians on these subjects and tracing the action or inaction o f their governments 
back to political ideas will provide a better understanding o f policy outcomes.
Ideas alone cannot adequately analyse public policy, and so some analysts provide 
a second interpretation, that o f policy interests. This approach focuses on the character of
44March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p. 3.
45March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p. 16.
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the economy and the relations among social classes.46 Policy is seen to be a result of social 
forces in conflict, and therefore attempts to assess who benefits from policy decisions are 
important.
The third approach involves political institutions such as federalism, parliament, 
cabinet and the bureaucracy. These are influenced by political ideas and economic 
relationships but are important in their own right. Federalism replicates and reinforces 
regionalism, Parliament reflects and also legitimizes power relationships in society, and the 
Courts adjudicate and define the limits o f political action. Therefore political institutions 
"make an independent contribution to both the conduct of politics in Canada and to policy 
outcomes."47
In most modem states, separate state institutions create, consolidate, divide, exercise, 
and adjudicate public authority. Constitutions preserve the internal diversification of the 
state, and impose limits on the exercise o f state power. In Canada, the three major pillars 
o f the Constitution, the Westminster Parliamentary system, federalism and the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, all play a role in the policy process. The parliamentary system is 
supposed to concentrate decision-making authority in the hands o f an elected executive that 
controls the legislative branch. Yet the centralization of power has been weakened by the 
need for regional pressures to be represented at the Cabinet level. The Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms has expanded the scope for judicial policy-making through the process o f judicial 
review.
46Michael Atkinson, Governing Canada. Institutions and Public Policy. (Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovitch Canada Inc.,),p.2.
47Michael Atkinson, Governing Canada, p. 3.
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No institutional arrangement contributes more to policy diffusion and structural 
incoherence than federalism. Federal institutions have impeded or delayed coherent and 
comprehensive policies in areas that would appear to need them. At the same time however, 
federalism has provided significant scope for policy experimentation and flexibility, prized 
qualities in a diverse political community.48
Alan Cairns states that the executive-centred institutions o f executive federalism 
often create barriers to the entry o f organized interests, while at the same time bureaucratic 
diffusion and shared jurisdictions may open avenues and opportunities for influence. 49 
Coleman and Skogstad theorize that the function o f executive federalism strengthens the 
capacity o f state officials and their ability to dominate a policy network.50 Federalism and 
its effect on public policy is a major force in the discussion of post-secondary education, and 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
Institutions organize politics and in so doing, they bias processes. They influence 
policy by constraining the range of possible outcomes; they "rule out" options by creating 
decision making processes that limit the number o f  access points, thus narrowing the range 
of interest that will be accommodated. They can also affect policy outcomes by refusing 
to consider certain options or by determining the order in which decisions are taken. 
Institutional resources also constrain policy, as do rules of decision making within the
4SKenneth McRoberts, "Federal Structures and the Policy Process," in Michael Atkinson
(ed.), Governing Canada.
49Alan Cairns, "Citizen (Outsiders) and Government (Insiders) in Constitution Making:
The Case of Meech Lake," Canadian Public Policy. (14, supplement, September, 1988), pp.
121 - 145.
S0Coleman and Skogstad, Policy Communities, p. 315,
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institution. Atkinson suggests that there is a creative side to institutions also. 
Paradoxically, by constraining options institutions create capacity.51 By limiting the number 
o f actors and access points to policy decisions, the actors develop a more "collegial" 
relationship, they speak the same language, share the same values and beliefs, and help to 
determine, describe and evaluate problems. Institutions then limit policy options to those 
which are institutionally acceptable.52
Frequently examinations of institutions and public policy are discussed in terms of 
causality. Differences in public policy are thought to be the result o f differences in political 
institutions. Atkinson illustrates this by citing E. E. Schattschneider who pointed out that 
some conflicts, issues, and groups are organized in, while others are organized out. But 
Atkinson also calls for caution, stating that it is unlikely that there is a simple causal 
connection between institutional change and policy change. He also points out that it is 
necessary to consider causality in the opposite direction. Policy can affect institutions, by 
making intellectual and technical demands on them.
Finally Atkinson admits that studying institutions is not a panacea for all problems 
o f  studying public policy. He remains uncertain for instance about the way in which 
institutions contribute to the evolution of public policy,53 yet he maintains that "the 
organization and character o f political institutions play a critical role in determining policy
SIMichael M. Atkinson, "Public Policy and the New Institutionalism," in Michael 
Atkinson (ed.) Governing Canada: Institutionssand Public Policy. (Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Canada Inc., Toronto, 1993), pp. 19-241
52Atkinson, Governing Canada, p. 24.
53Atkinson, Governing Canada, p. 16.
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CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONS: FEDERALISM AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
As stated in Chapter One, the institutionalist approach to studying public policy is 
enjoying a revival. State-centred theories such as an institutionalist approach attribute a 
greater degree of autonomy to the state in the formulation of public policy. Institutional 
structure, the way governments are organized, the degree of centralization, the way authority 
is shared or the formal mechanisms for registering decisions can all affect policy outputs. 
The structure o f the state may also determine the capacity o f societal actors to organize and 
pursue their interests. The state is frequently an independent and dominant actor in a policy 
field, and it pursues its own interests, which may be at odds with powerful societal actors.1 
For the study of public policy in Canada at the macro level, the most important institutional 
features are federalism, the executive-legislative structures, and occasionally the courts. 
Federalism
Federalism as a system of government is usually adopted for political or societal 
reasons. In Canada, it was necessary to choose a federal solution for both reasons. 
Federalism was a likely choice due to the need to accommodate the divergent interests of 
both the French/Catholic and English/Protestant settlements, as well as territorial 
governments in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. There are several theories o f federalism 
and its impact on public policy. In the 1950's W. S. Livingston wrote that the institutions 
of government:
1 Leslie Pal, State Class_and Bureaucracy. Canadian Unemployment Insurance and 
Public Policy. (McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston, 1988), pp. 8-9.
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are only the surface manifestations o f the deeper federal quality of the society
that lies beneath the surface. The essence of federalism lies not in the
constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself.2
However in 1977, Alan Cairns argued that this sociological view fails to perceive the 
degree of autonomy governments possess and their capacity to create the necessary 
conditions for their own survival. It fails to explain the survival and growth of provincial 
governments, especially those in English speaking Canada, and to consider that support for 
powerful, independent provincial governments is a product o f the political system itself.3 
Several authors have expanded on Cairns' criticisms and have concluded that federal systems 
once in place, draw their strength from the national apparatus o f government and ensure their 
own survival, regardless of whether there has been a significant transformation of the 
underlying society.4
Federalism can also be defined in strictly legal and institutional terms as "the method 
of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, 
coordinate and independent."5 Donald Smiley has expanded on this legalistic definition to 
include the qualifications that the constitution cannot be unilaterally amended by either
^  S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1956), p. 2
3Alan C. Cairns, "The Governments and Societies o f Canadian Federalism," in G. 
Williams (ed.) Constitution. Government and Society in Canada. (McClelland and Stewart, 
Toronto, 1988), p. 144-145.
4See Donald Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada. (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 
Toronto, 1987), p. 6., also Roger Gibbins, "Federal Societies, Institutions, and Politics," in 
Herman Bakv s and William Chandler, Federalism and the Role o f the State. (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987), pp. 15-31.
^ .C . Wheare, Federal Government. (4th ed.),(Oxford University Press, New York, 
1964), p. 11.
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government, and individual citizens are subject to the laws and authority of both central and 
regional governments.6
Another group o f institutional writers focus on the effects o f such organizations as 
the national legislatures and the party system on policy outputs.7 Recent works have 
concluded however that parties and legislatures no longer exercise the influence that they 
were once thought to have.8 Interestingly, a recent book on institutions and public policy 
does not include a chapter on the legislature.9 At the federal level, in the post-secondary 
education policy field, political parties and legislatures have had little impact on policy 
outcomes.
Other institutional features continue to attract attention: institutional structures can 
set the players, the rules o f play and the patterns o f political interaction. In his discussion 
of regionalism and institutions, Simeon concluded that institutions are not simply a product 
o f the environment but can also help to shape and influence their environment.10 There will
6Donald V. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada, (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 
1990), p. 2.
7See Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: the making of recent policy in 
Canada. (University o f Toronto Press, Toronto, 1972), Chapter 1, for a discussion of these 
writers and their theories.
8Leslie Pal, State. Class and Bureaucracy, p. 10.
9See Michael M. Atkinson, Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy. (Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich, Toronto, 1993), where he discusses the Cabinet, the Courts, federalism 
and the Public Service as all having an impact on public polity in Canada, but the 
Legislature is quite noticeably absent.
10Richard Simeon, "Regionalism and Canadian Political Institutions," in J. Peter 
Meekison, (ed.), Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality. (3rd edition), (Methuen, Toronto, 
1977, pp. 292-304), p. 297.
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always be a level o f symmetry between the nature of society and federal institutions in 
Canada where "... federal cleavages in society foster a federal system of government, which 
in turn reinforces the initial cleavages ...l,n 
Federalism and Public Policy
Federalism has often been a focus o f those who study public policy in Canada, 
especially with the growing awareness o f federal-provincial negotiation and the adoption of 
the Constitution Act 1982. This has been referred to as an "obsession with federalism", and 
for most Canadians it is "inseparable from their image o f their country..."12
Keith Banting however, cautions that Canadian political scientists "are prone to 
assume that these structures are somehow critical to the major social programs that we take 
for granted today".13 In his study on the welfare state, Banting found that while institutional 
patterns influenced income security they were not the only factor in determining policy. A 
multiplicity of other factors such as economic, social and demographic profiles, cultural and 
political make-up all leave their mark on the welfare state. Banting’s caution aside, there 
does appear to be wide agreement that federalism is crucial in explaining and understanding
“ Roger Gibbins, "Federal Societies, Institutions and Politics", in Herman Bakvis and 
William M. Chandler, (eds.) Federalism and the Role o f the State. (University o f Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 1987, pp. 15-31), p. 19.
I2Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, p. 1,2. Stevenson is not alone in his assessment. 
According to Peter Leslie "federalism appears to have far greater influence in Canada than 
it does in other federal countries ... In Canada, the most fundamental political relationships, 
defining the character o f Canadian society, are bound up in the structure o f the federal 
system." See Peter Leslie. Federal State. National Economy. (University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto, 1987), p. 4.
13Keith Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (2nd ed.), (Me Gill-Queen's 
University Press, Montreal, 1987), p. 4
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Canadian public policy.
Canadian federalism has over time been characterized by conflict and controversy 
regarding the division o f powers. Both federal and provincial governments have attempted 
to expand their de facto, and at times de ju re  powers at the other's expense. Frequent 
allegations have been voiced about trespassing on the constitutional powers of the other.14 
The Constitution Act 1867, states that "In and for each Province the Legislature may 
exclusively make Laws in relation to Education," (S. 93). Federal jurisdiction was limited 
to specific educational responsibilities for Native peoples, federal prisoners, military 
personnel, and citizens living in the federally governed territories. Although jurisdiction was 
granted to the provinces, the federal government has been interested in post-secondary 
education since the early days of Confederation. The conflict in this sector has stemmed 
from charges that the federal government is operating in an area o f provincial jurisdiction. 
Historically the most vociferous advocate o f this position was former Quebec Premier 
Duplessis, who directed universities in Quebec not to accept federal grants, based on the fact 
that they were an unconstitutional federal intrusion into provincial affairs.
Private interests also get drawn into the conflict. At times they argue that action by 
a government violated the constitutional division of powers, while at other times they have 
encouraged the expansion o f government activity without much regard for whether the 
jurisdiction of the other level o f government has been invaded.15 This has also been a factor
I4Garth Stevenson, "The Division o f Powers,” in Richard Simeon (ed.) Division of 
Powers and Public Policy. (University o f  Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985), pp 71-123, p. 72.
15L oc cit.
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in the post-secondary education field, evident in the lobbying o f the National Council of 
Canadian Universities (NCCU) for federal funding, with little thought given to the 
constitutional ramifications or the position it was placing the provincial governments in, 
especially Quebec. This will be examined in more detail in Chapter 3.
The reality of modem federalism demonstrates that there is no federal state in which 
policy responsibilities are allocated in even moderately watertight compartments. Both the 
division of powers and the sharing of powers have become essential aspects of contemporary 
federalism.16 Federalism has become a system of interactions between governments, 
dominated by "the coexistence o f governments which are at the same time interdependent 
and relatively autonomous..."17
Political institutions such as federalism influence the economic and cultural patterns 
o f a nation and thereby "exercise an important indirect influence on the social policies that 
it chooses to adopt."18 Canadian political institutions highlight the territorial dimensions of 
Canadian life, and create a set o f provincial governments with an interest in extending the 
distinctiveness and importance of regional concerns. For instance each province has its own 
university system, and there has been little discussion about rationalizing a provincial system 
out o f existence. At the national level, the electoral system, combined with the cabinet 
system of government, hamper the national government's ability to act as spokesperson for
16Peter Leslie, Federal State. National Economy, p. 42.
nRichard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Public Policy in 
Canada. (University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 3.
i .
l8Banting, The Welfare State, p. 39.
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the country as a whole.19 Political institutions also have a direct link with the substance of 
public policy. The most visible aspects o f this direct link are the constitutionally delineated 
decision-making processes of the state, including the allocation of legal authority among its 
units. In setting these basic procedures, the institutional framework has a number of 
important consequences for the substance of policy that emerges from it. According to a 
review of federalism done for the Macdonald Commission, "the structure of the federal 
system has influenced the substance of public policy."20 In the post-secondary sector, this 
has resulted in a very fragmented approach to federal involvement. Much as it has claimed 
that university education can be seen as a national interest, the federal government, 
especially since the 1960's, has been very cautious about increasing involvement, and in fact 
it has been backing away from it.
Atkinson has argued that institutions can be both constraining and creative. They 
provide or block opportunities for various actors to influence policy decisions, by setting the 
limits within which state and societal actors can operate. The reputation of federalism as a 
conservative factor in policy making, derives from impediments to decision-making. These 
impediments arise from a process that involves time-consuming bargaining among political
19The electoral system exaggerates regional differences in voting, while the Cabinet 
system of government with strict party discipline and secretive deliberations reduces the 
capacity of central governments to represent in a clear public manner the full diversity of 
regional interests, thereby further enhancing the role o f provincial governments as 
spokespersons for regional interests, even in areas o f federal jurisdiction. See Banting, The 
Welfare State, pp. 39-40.
20Frederick J. Fletcher and Donald C. Wallace, "Federal-Provincial Relations and the 
Making of Public Policy in Canada: A Review o f Case Studies,” in Richard Simeon, (ed.), 
Division of Powers and Public Policy. (University o f Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985), pp. 
125-206, p. 193.
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and administrative actors, which can exclude interest groups or public opinion. This is held 
up when looking at the federal role in the post-secondary education field. While the federal 
government is restrained by the constitution as far as the scope of its involvement, when the 
government has had the desire to act it has managed to muster the political will to do so 
(when supported by outside interests).
Federalism has permitted the provincial governments a level of creativity in 
developing their post-secondary education systems. This has led to a high level of diversity, 
and there are ten distinct provincial systems of post-secondary education in Canada. On the 
other hand, there is also a high degree of convergence as each has a binary system, or clearly 
defined university and non-degree granting sectors. Most universities offer comprehensive 
programs, including graduate and professional programs (although some are limited to 
undergraduate studies). Aside from two small religious affiliated institutions, all universities 
in Canada are public institutions incorporated by an act o f the provincial legislature.21
Federalism shapes the "terms of the debate", of politics in Canada. Political and 
bureaucratic elites are absorbed with the questions o f jurisdiction, and the right of 
governments to act in policy areas. This preoccupation with their own interests centres 
around relationships with other governments, encouraging the public to view these elites as 
self-regarding and unconcerned with popular needs and concerns.22
21Michael Skolnik, "Higher Education Systems in Canada," in Alexander D. Gregor and 
Gilles Jasmin (eds.), Higher Education in Canada. (Association for Canadian Studies for the 
Department o f Secretary o f State Canada, Ottawa, 1992), pp. 15-17.
K enneth  McRoberts, "Federal Structures and the Policy Process," in Michael Atkinson (ed.) 
Governing Canada, p. 165.
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Executive F ederalism
The rise of the modern administrative state in Canada has led to larger and more 
powerful federal and provincial governments and bureaucracies, accompanied by a growing 
interdependence as each level o f government attempts to realize its constitutional potential. 
What one government does will have implications for others, and frequently areas of 
government activity cut across formal divisions o f responsibility (ie. welfare policy, 
economic policy and transportation policy). With governments sharing functions, and citizen 
demands not necessarily respecting constitutional lines of authority, the reality of policy 
making is that governments must attempt to coordinate policy in order to achieve the goals 
o f efficiency and effectiveness. This means that governments will inevitably interact with 
each other. This is a more dynamic view of federalism than the classical legalistic view, one 
which understands it as a political process, characterized by bargaining.
The mechanism for adjustment in these negotiations is executive federalism which 
has been defined by Smiley as:
the relations between elected and appointed officials of the two orders of
government in federal-provincial interactions and among the executives of
the provinces in interprovincial interactions."23
Executive federalism tries to resolve the conflicts arising from the Canadian attempt 
to blend the institutions o f federalism and parliamentary responsible government. These two 
constitutional "pillars" are based on fundamentally different and contradictory premises.24
^Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question. (3rd edition)(McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 
Toronto 1980), p. 91.
24Federalism means that the Canadian territorial division o f power takes the form of 
two distinct levels o f government, each endowed with distinct yet often overlapping
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Policy making in federal parliamentary states can be accomplished only where "effective 
joint action takes place between individual ministers and their administrations rather than 
between parliaments or between cabinets in any but a formal sense."25 The addition of the 
Charter o f Rights and Freedoms in 1982, has made political structures even more complex.
Federalism, primarily through the workings o f executive federalism, ensures that the 
interests o f governments assume an unusual importance in decision-making, and may 
insulate decision-makers from public wishes.26 This insulation leads to the exclusion of 
interest groups from the policy process primarily because policy discussions frequently take 
place in negotiations between executives o f different governments. Executive federalism 
has "technocratized" the policy process, making it necessary for citizens and interest groups 
to have knowledge of both constitutional jurisdiction and the complex structures of 
intergovernmental collaboration. I f  groups lack this knowledge or are not linked to well 
equipped groups that do have it, they can feel excluded from the policy discussion.27
This is not to say that executive federalism is impregnable. For example during the
jurisdictions. Parliamentary responsible government means that executive and legislative 
institutions operate in such a fashion that the cabinet plays a key role within both the federal 
and provincial levels o f government. Parliamentary practices have led to the prominence of 
the executives in each government and federal-provincial interdependence has required their 
interaction. Ronald L. Watts, Executive Federalism: A Comparative Analysis. (Institute 
of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's 
University, Kingston, 1989), p. 4,
“ John Warhurst, "Managing Intergovernmental Relations," in Bakvis and Chandler, 
Federalism and the Role o f the_State. p. 259.
“ Pal, State. Bureaucracy and Class, p. 139, Banting The Welfare State, p. 42.
K enneth McRoberts, "Federal Structures and the Policy Process", in M. Atkinson, 
Governing Canada, p. 164.
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constitutional debates prior to patriation both women's groups and aboriginal groups 
managed to break through the tight knit-wall o f  executive and administrative officials and 
get their agenda across.28 Additionally, the failure o f both the Meech Lake Accord and 
Charlottetown Accord were defeats for executive federalism. While these defeats on 
constitutional issues indicate a new found unwillingness to accept the outcomes of executive 
federalism in all instances, nonetheless, most important policy decisions are still made at the 
executive level.
Provincial premiers meet to discuss issues o f mutual concern annually, and have done 
so since Premier Lesage o f Quebec convened a meeting in Quebec City in 1960 and 
suggested ongoing conferences. While originally designed to examine provincial and 
interprovincial issues, a recent survey of Annual Premiers Conferences discovered that since 
1976 federal-provincial fiscal relations have been one o f the three dominant themes on the 
agenda.29
There are also frequent meetings between regional premiers. Western Premiers meet 
annually, and the Maritime Premiers have established a regional council with its own 
permanent secretariat. Both the Western Council and the Maritime Conference issue press 
releases condemning federal economic policies or requesting federal funds for 'regional'
28See for example Chaviva Hosek, "Women and the Constitutional Process'1, and 
Doug Sanders, "The Indian Lobby", in Richard Simeon and Keith Banting, (eds.), And No 
One Cheered.(Methuen, Toronto, 1983).
29The other two dominant themes on the agenda at the Annual Premiers Conference 
have been the national economy and federal government policies, and constitutional 
questions. See Donald Savoie, The Politics o f Public Spending in Canada. (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1990), p. 272.
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projects such as highway construction, post- secondary education, economic development, 
health care, agriculture or fisheries.30
Prior to 1968, Federal-Provincial Conferences or First Ministers' Conferences (FMC) 
as they have come to be known, dealt almost exclusively with fiscal and taxation matters, 
shared-cost programs, and constitutional amendments. However, the scope and frequency 
of these meetings has become more extensive. During the Trudeau era, 23 conferences were 
convened over a period of 16 years. Eight First Minister's Conferences were held between 
1983-1987, an average o f a two a year. In the Meech Lake Accord of June 1987, there was 
an attempt to institutionalize these meetings, by 'requiring' the Prime Minister to convene 
a FMC at least once a year to discuss the state o f the Canadian economy and other matters 
deemed to be appropriate.
With the scope o f the conferences expanded beyond fiscal and constitutional matters, 
FMCs are now major events in Canadian politics. They attract well over 200 government 
delegates and advisers, and are major national media events.31 One of the major criticisms 
of these Conferences is that the Prime Minister must assume roles which may conflict, as the 
head of government with interests to defend, and as leader o f  a national political party.32 The 
Prime Minister is viewed by the Premiers as just one o f eleven participants in these 
conferences, a notion that was anathema to some Prime Ministers, including Pierre Trudeau. 
In addition, the federal government usually comes under criticism, and is publicly placed on
30Loc. cit.
31 Savoie, The Politics o f Public Spending, p. 273.
32Smiley, Canada in-Question, pp. 99-100.
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the defensive, and it is often difficult for the Prime Minister, as Chair of the meeting, to 
adequately defend the federal government's policies or positions. As a result many federal 
politicians and officials are less than enthusiastic about holding Conferences.
Within the post-secondary education sector, executive federalism is exhibited by 
interprovincial meetings o f Ministers of Education. Prior to 1967, the provincial Ministers 
o f Education had been meeting as an informal committee of the Canadian Education 
Association, they then established a formal, interprovincial organization: the Council of 
Ministers o f Education o f Canada (CMEC). This organization was created to facilitate inter­
provincial co-operation on education matters and to promote the development of education 
in Canada. In addition to the growth o f formal council and conference meetings, 
executive federalism has also given rise to a number o f informal agreements, and hundreds 
o f day to day contacts. Along with machinery to accommodate the more extensive concerns 
o f  the two levels o f government, there is a vast and complex network of federal-provincial 
interactions dealing with more specific matters. At this level, the interaction is more specific 
and because o f the more limited scope o f interaction, there is more likely to be agreement- 
based on the professional norms o f bureaucrats involved whether they are engineers, 
foresters, social workers or public health specialists.33
In a 1979 article Donald Smiley was critical o f executive federalism, stating that it 
contributes to undue secrecy and low levels o f participation in public affairs by citizens. 
Executive federalism has usurped the role o f political parties in helping to shape public-
33Smiley, Canada in Question, and Warhurst "Managing Intergovernmental 
Relations"
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policy. By shifting decision making from individual governments to executive 
intergovernmental conferences, it reduces the accountability o f governments to their 
legislatures. Executive federalism "organizes into politics" the interests of governments and 
those private groupings which are territorially concentrated. In addition, it leads to 
continuing conflict among governments.34 
The Evolution of Intergovernmental Relations
The relationship between governments in Canada is "an active and complex 
relationship reflecting a high degree o f inter-dependence."35 This is inevitable since two 
orders o f government are required to manage the federation. It has also become more 
important with the increase in government activity since WWII.
Between WWTC and the 1950’s, under co-operative federalism, relations were narrow, 
functional and program oriented, having little effect or interaction in other sectors. Federal- 
provincial interaction was limited to tax arrangements and cooperation with respect to 
specific services through shared-cost programs. The sharing of taxes and revenues was 
determined by finance and treasury departments who worked in relative isolation from 
officials and agencies o f the two levels who were concerned with specific programs.36
By the 1960's, the increased level o f co-operation between government had led to
34Donald Smiley, "An Outsider's Observations o f Federal-Provincial Relations 
Among Consenting Adults," in Richard Simeon (ed.), Confrontation and Collaboration. 
(Institute o f Public Administration o f Canada, Toronto, 1979), p. 106-107.
35Bruce G. Pollard, Managing the Interface: Intergovernmental Affairs Agencies in 
Canada. (Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, Kingston, 1986), p. 
1.
36Smiley, Canada in Question, p. 95.
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executive federalism which is characterized by the concentration and centralization of 
authority at the top of each participating government. Under executive federalism, control 
and supervision of intergovernmental relations is achieved by politicians and officials with 
a wide range o f functional interests. This shift from co-operative to executive federalism had 
two major implications for intergovernmental relations. First, the interactions were 
increasingly politicized, and were concerned with broader and higher profile issues. The 
other consequence was the development o f new structures to liaise with other governments, 
previously handled within sectoral departments.37
During the 1970's many federal-provincial contacts were between middle and lower 
level bureaucrats, discussing professional and technical considerations. Reflecting Prime 
Minister Trudeau’s personal concern with federalism, there was a rapid development of 
administrative machinery in both levels o f government for dealing explicitly with 
intergovernmental affairs. In particular the intergovernmental affairs manager was 
introduced, who was not involved directly with programs but with federal, provincial and 
interprovincial relations. Also during Trudeau's government the Federal-Provincial 
Relations Office was established in 1975.38
As previously mentioned, some authors have stated that executive federalism 
increases conflict within government. Smiley placed some o f this blame squarely on the 
shoulders o f the inter-governmental affairs specialist.
The role o f the intergovernmental affairs specialist is to protect and extend
37PoIlard, Managing the Interface, p. 3.
38Smiley, Canada in Question, p. 97.
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the powers of the jurisdiction for which he works, and an important element 
of this power adheres in its financial resources ... because his counterparts in 
other governments have the same motivations, conflict is inevitable.39
John Warhurst is more sympathetic toward intergovernmental specialists. He feels
that their importance and impact has been overestimated, while the positive contribution they
have made to the efficient management of the system is neglected.40
In most governments, intergovernmental affairs units were created in finance and
treasury departments at a time when intergovernmental relations were almost exclusively
concerned with fiscal matters. Although the range of concerns has expanded, fiscal issues
remain near the top of the agenda. Therefore inter-governmental units in finance or treasury
departments are powerful elements in the bureaucracies of all governments in Canada.41
The mandate o f provincial finance and treasury departments includes the
responsibility for funds coming from the federal government. Their key objective
concerning fiscal and inter-govemmental relations is the optimization o f federal transfer
arrangements, which underlie much of intergovernmental interaction. Departments of
finance therefore play a central role in policy decisions especially in areas that are
predominantly financial, such as fiscal arrangements and EPF. Other policy sectors are
involved in negotiations such as health and education, but finance departments play the lead
39Donald V. Smiley, "An Outsider’s Observations o f Federal-Provincial Relations 
Among Consenting Adults," in Richard Simeon (ed.) Confrontation and Collaboration. 
(Toronto, Institute of Public Administration o f Canada, 1979, pp. 105- 113), p. 110.
40Warhurst, "Managing Intergovernmental Relations," p. 267-268.
4IPoIIard, Managing the Interface, p. 11
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role with respect to these issues.42
According to Richard Simeon, the failure o f traditional institutions at the national 
level (parliament, cabinet, senate and political parties) to effectively operate as sites for 
federal-provincial negotiation has led to the development o f an ad hoc adjustment process 
outside o f  the prescribed institutional forms. The most noticeable o f these is federal- 
provincial conferences. Inadequate national institutions is one reason why intergovernmental 
negotiations have taken the form of direct confrontation between governments.43
Federal legislators are often frustrated by the increasing policy-making role of 
federal-provincial negotiations. The failure of Parliament to act as an arena for federal- 
provincial adjustment is an important reason for the negotiation process itself. The more 
important negotiations become, the more Parliament gets bypassed, and the less central it 
is in the adjustment process. This point was well illustrated in both the Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown Accords. The Meech Lake Accord was presented as a fait accompli to the 
House o f Commons, and some provincial legislatures. The Charlottetown Accord was an 
exercise in participatory democracy with the agreement hammered out between federal and 
provincial officials going to a national referendum, but legislatures were no more involved 
in this process than they had been with Meech.
Intergovernmental relations also have an impact on interest groups and their ability 
to access the decision-making process. Simeon studied three cases, financial, constitutional 
and pension issues, and in not one o f the cases did interest groups have a significant effect
42Pollard, Managing the Interface, pp. 43, 85-86.
43Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p. 30-32.
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on the outcome once the issue had entered the federal-provincial arena. Again Simeon was 
writing in the 1970's prior to the "citizen's constitution"44 where both women and aboriginal 
groups were able to re-enter the arena after being in effect 'shuffled off* the table’ by 
government negotiators.
One important determinant o f the frequency of government interaction is the formal 
constitutional division of powers. When the constitution allocates functions jointly to both 
levels, or is silent or ambiguous on important powers, or the financial resources assigned to 
governments do not permit them to carry out their assigned functions, then interaction will 
be more frequent. In addition, intergovernmental interaction is likely to be more frequent 
the less the institutional arrangements at the national level accommodate regional interests.45
Because federal-provincial negotiation is so important, major issues tend to become 
defined as federal-provincial ones. When this happens, the status and prestige concerns of 
governments, which may be harder to resolve, are superimposed over simple policy 
differences. This tends to put governments in conflict with governments and thus adds an 
important dimension to the conflict.
Fiscal Ecderalism
Federal constitutions, along with delineating divisions of power, also set out the 
sharing of revenue sources between the two levels of government. Fiscal federalism refers 
to those "more permanent, institutional arrangements relating to the financing of each
44See Alan Cairns, Government (Insiders), Citizen (Outsiders) in Canadian Journal 
of Political Science (S 1988).
4SSimeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p. 303.
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component unit."46 Fiscal federalism has been an important issue in Canada, since prior to 
Confederation.47 Two of the key features of the Canadian federal fiscal system that 
distinguish it from other systems are the high degree o f decentralization of fiscal 
responsibilities and the relatively high degree o f harmony in the services provided by the 
provinces.48
The high degree of interdependence necessary for the effective operation of federal 
states rests on two fundamental requirements; a recognition o f the autonomy of each order 
o f government, and a need for co-operation between the two orders. Failure to satisfy one 
or the other can, in the long run, result in complete disruption o f the system.49 Nowhere is 
the need for co-operation between the two orders of government more pressing than in the 
area of public finance. There are four broad public finance issues that must be dealt with in 
all modem federations, referred to as fiscal federalism issues. These are: revenue-sharing, 
or the achievement o f fiscal balance; fiscal equalization; financing provincial programs 
deemed to be o f national interest; and fiscal and economic co-ordination.
One major factor to consider in Canada is the fiscal gap caused by the constitutional 
mismatch in revenue raising capacity and program responsibility. The provinces have
46R.D. Oiling and M.W. Westmacott, "Fiscal Federalism" in Oiling and Westmacott, 
(eds.), Perspectives on Canadian Federalism. Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1988), p. 165.
47Some provinces found the original Confederation agreement appealing, as it would 
erase their debt loads, and assist with the building in financing large-scale transportation and 
communication projects.
48Robin W. Boadway and Paul A.R. Hobson, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in 
Canada. (Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 1993), p. 3.
49Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements, Fiscal 
Federalism in Canada. August 1981, p.30.
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dominance in key (and expensive) social policy fields, while the federal government has 
greater revenue raising ability. Revenue sharing requires that a reasonable balance be 
attained between revenue needs and expenditure responsibilities for each government.50 The 
fiscal gap in Canada is substantial and the response has been for the federal government to 
transfer funds to the provincial governments in a variety o f  ways, for equalization and 
shared-cost programs.
Fiscal equalization attempts to ensure that since all provincial governments have the 
same constitutional responsibilities, they have the same financial capacity to carry out these 
responsibilities.51 There are some instances in which federal financing in areas o f provincial 
jurisdiction is desirable or warranted. Spillover is one such circumstance, where benefits 
arising from a provincial initiative tend to spill over into other provinces. This is particularly 
true in the area o f post-secondary education due to the mobility o f highly-skilled people.52
Although federal transfers to the provinces have been ongoing almost since 
Confederation, the provinces have argued that the federal government has simply spent its 
way into provincial jurisdictions. Federal funding in areas o f provincial jurisdiction has 
usually been based on the federal spending power, which although not explicitly discussed 
in the constitution, has been defined as "permitting expenditures in areas outside the
50Ibid., p. 32-35.
slIbid., pp. 35-36.
52Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements, Fiscal Federalism in 
Canada, pp. 37-39. See for example a recent article by Susan Hiller, "Newfoundland's Brain 
Drain," Macleans. August 28, 1995.
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legislative competence of the spending government."33 Government powers to spend can
perhaps best be understood if one thinks o f government as having a dual personality. The
first is the government as legislature and regulator, while the other
has all the attributes of a normal person; it can buy property, engage in 
business, give gifts, or hire employees. It is from this aspect of its 
personality that the spending power comes.54
While it is sometimes suggested that federal spending could be limited with a more rigid
adherence to constitutional strictures, this is unlikely to happen. The constitution has not
historically inhibited provincial governments, municipalities, associations, or individuals
from making demands on the federal government for new spending.
The federal government has successfully argued that the spending power is justified
under a number o f sections o f the Constitution Act 1867. First under S. 91(3) the federal
government is unfettered in its ability to raise money by "any mode or system of taxation",
while S. 92(2) is more restrictive on the provincial ability to raise revenue through direct
taxation for provincial purposes. In addition the preamble to S. 91 allows the federal
government to make laws for the "peace order and good government o f Canada". Under S.
106 of Constitution the federal government has the right to use its revenue for matters
deemed to be in the public interest. The "peace, order and good government" clause gives
a more general justification for spending measures that are meant to be in the national
S3Leslie Pal, "Federalism, Social Policy and the Constitution", in Jacqueline Ismael 
(ed.), Canadian Social Welfare Policy. Federal and Provincial Dimensions. (Institute of 
Public Administration of Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston, 1985, pp.l-
20), p. 11
54DonaId Savoie, The Politics o f Public Spending, p. 287.
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interest.55 The federal spending power is important because it permits Ottawa to spend in 
areas which can be argued to be in the national interest, such hospital insurance, health, and 
post-secondary education.
Finally, although the funds come from the federal government, the ultimate 
legislative responsibility for the program in question is left to the provinces. Therefore, 
financial incentives offered through the spending power are assumed not to interfere with 
the ultimate provincial legislative power as long as the federal government does not directly 
engage in program provision.56 The provinces administer the programs and are able to 
maintain considerable flexibility in many aspects of program design. For instance university 
systems differ across provinces, with Saskatchewan requiring 12 years o f public school to 
enter a three year Bachelor o f Arts program, while Ontario has 13 years o f public schooling, 
but also has a three year Bachelor o f Arts program.
The failed Meech Lake Accord would have legitimized the use o f the spending 
power, by providing the provinces the option to "opt out" o f  any new federal social 
programs, with compensation. I f  it had been ratified, the federal government would have 
had full constitutional recognition to spend in areas o f exclusive provincial jurisdiction.57
The final fiscal issue is fiscal and economic co-ordination between the two levels of 
government. This is necessary to ensure that policy measures by one government do not
55Robin W. Boadway, and Paul A.R. Hobson, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in 
Canada. (Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 1993), p. 7.
56L oc cit.
57Donald Savoie, The Politics o f Public Spending, p.287.
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neutralize or offset measures taken by the other.58 The establishment of the Continuing 
Committee on Fiscal and Economic Matters in 1955 was a breakthrough in the co-operation 
o f federal provincial fiscal relations. This committee was a model of how executive 
federalism can work. According to A.R. Kear, it operated in a neutral, objective fashion, 
pursuing consensus and studying policy.59 Composed of federal and provincial officials, it 
met periodically to exchange information and examine technical problems in the field of 
federal-provincial fiscal and economic relations. Fiscal relations were institutionalized 
further with the development, in 1964, o f the Tax Structure Committee which established 
a machinery for fiscal cooperation. It consisted of Ministers o f Finance and Treasurers, who 
were collectively to report on several important matters to the Federal-Provincial Conference 
early in 1966.60
Government decisions to use certain powers to legislate in policy areas (such as the 
federal spending powers) are more complex than a simple consideration of constitutional 
jurisdictions might suggest. As our discussion of policy in chapter one pointed out, other 
factors may affect the decision such as public opinion, elite interaction, ideology, party 
competition, or class conflict.61 The justification for a federal role in social policy has by
5*Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements, Fiscal Federalism in 
Canada, p. 41.
59For a more detailed study o f this committee, see A,R. Kear, "Federal-Provincial 
Continuing Committee on Fiscal and Economic Matters", Canadian Public Administration. 
1963.
“ Smiley, Canada in Question, p. 95.
“Leslie Pal, "Federalism, Social Policy and the Constitution," in Jacqueline S. Ismael 
(ed.) Canadian Social Welfare Policy. Federal and Provincial Dimensions. (Institute of 
Public
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necessity had to go beyond constitutional arguments. Aside from political advantage and 
ideology Pal states there are three arguments. The first is that national standards in 
provincial programs or national programs provide a focus for citizenship and national unity. 
The second argument is that some local and provincial services might not be established or 
developed to the optimum level because beneficiaries might move elsewhere. Externalities 
are problems faced by sub-national units, not a national one, and thus Ottawa may have a 
role in subsidizing local services. Pal's final argument is that regional economic disparities 
might mean that services in some parts o f the country would be greatly inferior to services 
in other parts. Federal government monies can thus serve to reduce these disparities.62 All 
o f Pal's arguments are pertinent to the post-secondary education field. Education is 
frequently cited as a focus for citizenship, national unity and developing a national culture. 
As previously mentioned, spillover is a problem in this sector, due to the high level of 
mobility o f graduates. Finally post-secondary education systems are expensive to operate, 
and without federal funding, it is unclear whether some o f the smaller provinces would be 
able to maintain their system.
Federal Transfer Payments
A number o f fiscal arrangements have developed in response to specific fiscal 
problems in Canada, using three main components; tax-sharing agreements, equalization 
payments and shared-cost programs. We are primarily concerned here with the federal
Administration of Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston, 1985, pp.
1-20), p. 10.
62Pal, "Federalism, Social Policy and the Constitution," pp. 12-14.
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spending power and its role in permitting Ottawa to participate in shared-cost programs.63 
Shared-cost programs have traditionally been important to the federal government for the 
reasons mentioned above, and have been delivered in one o f three ways; conditional grants, 
unconditional grants, and tax abatements.
In the post-secondary education field shared-cost programs had been in existence 
since 1912 for vocational and technical training. A 1941 Order-in-council allowed for 
federal transfers for universities, in order to pay for the education of returning veterans. In 
1951 as the "veteran's bulge" began to decline, the St. Laurent government, acting on the 
recommendations o f the Massey Commission and at the behest o f the National Council of 
Canadian Universities (NCCU), instituted direct grants to the universities based on 
provincial population. The attitude of the provincial governments to these grants was mixed. 
The universities needed the funds, and the provincial governments were not prepared to 
provide them. On the other hand the federal government had used its spending powers 
without consulting the provinces in an area that was exclusive provincial jurisdiction.
The period after the Second World War was a period of federal dominance in fiscal 
affairs, when the federal government was implementing a myriad of social programs such 
as old age security, pensions, unemployment assistance, and health and medical care. This 
was fuelled not only by fiscal capacity but also by the expertise of the federal bureaucracy 
and general public support.64
63Pal, "Federalism, Social Policy and the Constitution", p. 12.
“ In spite o f provincial objections, many Canadians then and now supported the 
spending of federal money and the rapid development o f social programs, including those 
conditions that allowed these programs to take on aspects o f national programs. See Thomas
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Over the next few years, however, the provinces went through the process of 
"province building"63 and began objecting to federal intrusion into their jurisdiction. Led by 
Premier Lesage, Quebec began demanding an end to shared-cost programs, and a tax 
abatement to the provinces to cover the amount o f federal transfers. Using the precedent of 
a 1959 federal-Quebec agreement on university funding which transferred one percentage 
point o f corporate taxable income to Quebec in lieu o f federal payments to Quebec 
universities, he argued that well-established programs did not need federal involvement. In 
1965, in response to provincial objections, Parliament legislated that all provinces could opt 
out of shared cost programs with compensation if desired. Only Quebec took advantage of 
the opportunity.
In 1967 the direct grants to universities were replaced with conditional grants, in a 
shared-cost program which combined cash and tax point transfers.65 This funding was 
slightly less distasteful to the provinces as the funds went to the provinces, not the 
universities. In general, however, throughout the period o f direct grants, (1951-1967), and 
the conditional grants (1967-1977), there were persistent complaints from the provinces that
Courchene, Economic Management and the Division o f Powers. (University o f Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 1986), p. 105.
6SThe concept o f province building is described by Paul Barker as the development 
of administrative skills in provincial governments, the more conscious use of the state by 
provincial governments, the formulation of explicit provincial objectives, along with the 
emergence of aggressive provincial leaders willing to use the levers of the state, and the 
growing importance o f matters under the jurisdiction o f the provinces. Paul Barker,"The 
Development of the Major Shared-cost Programs in Canada", in Oiling and Westmacott, 
Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, p. 203.
66Tax point transfer is a reduction in federal income tax with a corresponding increase 
in provincial income tax.
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the federal government was using its spending powers and exploiting provincial fiscal 
weaknesses to interfere in their jurisdiction. The shared-cost programs were open-
ended from the federal perspective (the government matched what the provinces spent), 
which made it difficult for the federal government to budget. The federal government was 
concerned that the provinces were exercising little restraint in spending "fifty-cent dollars", 
and costs for post-secondary education were escalating so quickly that in 1972 the federal 
government imposed a 15 per cent ceiling on the annual growth of its post-secondary 
education transfer.
In the mid 1970's the federal government sought to limit its liability to the provinces 
and to control its costs, which were to a large degree determined by decisions made by the 
ten provincial governments. In June 1976, during the Annual Conference of First Ministers, 
a new fiscal arrangement was suggested which would replace the conditional grants with 
unconditional grants for three "established" programs, post-secondary education, medicare 
and hospital insurance. The Established Programs Financing Act o f 1977, provided federal 
support for these established programs through unconditional block grants to the provinces 
in a combination of cash and tax transfers, based on provincial population and the growth 
in national income, tied to the Gross National Product.
Both levels of government endorsed the change in funding. The EPF Act was 
designed to let provinces decide on priorities and expenditure levels for the established 
programs. It was also devised to put an end to the use o f shared-cost programs as vehicles 
for developing and maintaining Canada-wide programs with national standards.67 From the
67Savoie, Politics o f Public Spending, p. 279
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federal perspective the new arrangements ensured a continued federal presence in both post­
secondary education and health care while enabling the federal government to plan its own 
fiscal expenditures.
From the provinces’ standpoint, the new block funding was almost ideal. They had 
long felt that provincial spending priorities were being distorted by the lure of fifty-cent 
dollars. The new funds came with no strings attached, to be spent as they pleased, or at least 
in a way that they could justify politically. On the other hand, while it did provide for 
greater autonomy for the provinces, there was some grumbling that the federal government 
had enticed the provinces into expensive federally designed programs (such as health care) 
and encouraged spending on post-secondary education using conditional grants during the 
expansion of the 1950’s and 1960's and shifted to unconditional grants a decade later leaving 
the provinces to deal with three o f the most rapidly increasing areas o f expenditures.68
While some authors maintain that the federal government never respected the spirit 
o f unconditionality,69 providing separate cheques to the provinces for health and post- 
secondary education and that it monitored provincial spending in these areas, it was evident 
at the time that the federal government fully intended the provinces to live up to the moral 
obligation o f funding the established programs with the federal funds.70 The federal 
government had assumed that the provincial level o f funding would rise at the same level as 
the GNF. In announcing the EPF Arrangements Prime Minister Trudeau had stated that the
68Ibid.
69Thomas Courchene, Economic Management and the Division o f Powers, p. 107.
70Pierre E. Trudeau, "Established Programs Financing and Post-secondary 
Education".
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federal government was not abandoning its interest in the established programs and th a t"... 
when funds are made available by Parliament under the spending power, there is a need to 
ensure that the funds are spent wisely."71
The EPF arrangements were an excellent example o f executive federalism at work. 
The secrecy and complexity o f the negotiations limited public awareness of the issues 
surrounding the arrangements. In addition the issues o f intergovernmental concern such as 
jurisdiction, structure and finance were prominent in the discussions. On the other hand, 
EPF did prove to be an effective way to accommodate fiscal needs and constitutional 
rigidities.
Almost immediately the federal government appeared to have second thoughts with 
respect to the 1977 arrangements. In the summer o f 1978, Ottawa attempted to renegotiate 
the financial package. In particular, the minister o f finance served notice to the provinces 
that he wished to have the total payments escalate at a slower rate. By the early 1980’s the 
federal government was complaining that they were getting no credit for financing the 
programs, and that provincial governments were not spending the EPF payments in the 
programs they were designed for and were in fact diverting part o f these payments to other 
programs.72 This circumvented the federal government’s accountability to the federal 
Parliament, as Parliament was approving the transfer o f funds for specific reasons. Finally, 
the transfers to provinces are a large part o f the federal expenditure budget, and the transfer
71Ibid.
^Savoie, The Politics o f Public Spending, p. 279. See also the report commissioned 
by the federal Secretary o f State, by A.W. Johnson, Giving Greater Point and Purpose to the 
Federal Financing of Post-secondary Education in Canada. (1985).
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payments came under review as part o f the overall shift in priorities to fiscal restraint.
In the 1982 renewal agreement, the transfer was split, with health receiving 67.9% 
of the transfers, and post-secondary education receiving 32.1%. Also, the federal 
government dropped two income tax points that were added to the 1977 arrangement as a 
compromise for the termination o f the revenue guarantee. In 1983-84 and 1984-85 the 
Liberal government applied its six and five anti-inflation programme to the post-secondary 
education portion of the EPF transfers. Growth was limited to six percent in 1983-84, and 
five percent in 1984-85. In 1986, the Conservative government partially de-indexed the EPF 
escalator to two percent below the rate o f growth of the GNP. In 1989 the federal budget 
further de-indexed the escalator by one percent. In the 1990 budget the government 
proposed Bill C 69 which froze per capita EPF transfers for the 1990-91 and 1991-92 fiscal 
years, after which a further one percent de-indexing would take effect. EPF transfers would 
now grow at three percent below the rate of growth of GNP. The 1991 budget extended the 
freeze on per capita transfers for another three years to end in fiscal 1994-95, freezing the 
growth at three percent below GNP.73
The EPF arrangements represent "a substantial disengagement"7* o f federal and 
provincial activity. With the changes in 1986 the federal government began a process o f 
gradual withering away of EPF. Cash entitlements began to grow at below GNP rate while 
tax revenue from transfers continued to rise. In effect the cash transfers will disappear,
73AUCC, Federal Support for University Education, p. 4.
74Richard Simeon, “The Federal-Provincial Decision-making Process,” inR.S. Blair 
and J.T. Me Leod (eds.), The Canadian Political Tradition. (Methuen, Toronto, 1987), p. 
433.
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making it more difficult for the federal government to continue to have any leverage in the 
policy field. In addition EPF led to increased federal-provincial conflict and deteriorating 
federal-provincial relations, as each level blames the other for deteriorating levels of 
services.
With the new federal budget o f 1995, the EPF arrangements, along with other 
transfers from the federal to provincial governments are being replaced with the Canada 
Social Transfer, an unconditional, no strings attached lump sum transfer to the provinces for 
all social programs. While the autonomy of provinces will be enhanced, the provincial 
premiers are almost unanimous in their condemnation of the federal govemment/s unilateral 
move, as they were not consulted prior to the announced decisions. The new transfer, to be 
implemented on October I, 1995, is designed to disentangle the federal government from a 
web of separate funding arrangements. It is designed to permit better accountability, and 
budgeting on the part o f the federal government, but also is designed as part o f its overall 
fiscal restraint package.
According to David Cameron, the evolution of the post-secondary education policy 
field exhibits both the best and the worst o f Canadian federalism. The interplay of federal 
and provincial policies and programs demonstrates the benefits of effective cooperation, and 
shows the creative side o f institutions such as federalism. The resulting turmoil of 
intergovernmental competition demonstrates the conflictual nature of executive federalism 
and intergovernmental relations. Professor Cameron feels that "heavy handed use of the
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federal spending power"75 illustrates federalism at its worst. It has caused a great deal of 
conflict between the two levels o f government, and the legacy of provincial distrust caused 
by these actions continuous to pervade intergovernmental relations. This will be discussed 
in the next chapter as we discuss federal involvement and funding of post-secondary 
education in some detail.
Within the post-secondary education sector there are positive signs regarding the role 
o f federalism. The funding o f research is an area where both levels o f government have 
managed to fulfil their objectives without stepping on each other's toes, and without formal 
definition o f roles. There has been a degree of co-operation, with some provinces helping 
their universities compete for federal funding.76
The Canada Student Loans Program is one which again shows how federalism can 
work creatively and within boundaries acceptable to both levels o f government to achieve 
public policy goals. The federal and provincial constitutional jurisdictions are both 
respected and blended. The federal government participates by subsidizing interest rates 
through financial institutions, and student applications are reviewed and approved by 
provincial authorities. Provinces coordinate the federal programs with their own grant and 
bursary programs and present a coordinated package to the student.77
In the following chapter we will examine the historical development of federal 
involvement in post-secondary education in more detail. This will familiarize us with the
75David Cameron, More Than an Academic Question: Universities. Government and 
Public Policy in Canada. (Institute For Research on Public Policy, Halifax, 1991), p. 437.
76Cameron, More Than An Academic Question, p. 438.
^Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, p.438.
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major players and historical justification for some of the actions taken by some of these 
players. This will in turn set the stage for Chapter Four, where we will examine the policy 
community surrounding the post-secondary education community, and attempt to discern the 
strengths and legitimacy o f the federal government’s role in post-secondary education.
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CHAPTER-3
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 
IN POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION
The notion that there is a relationship between statehood, nationhood, culture, and 
education is not new. Two thousand years ago Diogenes asserted that "the foundation of 
every state is the education of the youth”.1 The relationship between nationhood, culture and 
education has attracted the attention of interested groups o f nationalists in Canada since 
confederation.
The nationalist founders of the Canada First movement in 1868, for example, wanted 
to promote a sense o f national purpose and pride, and to lay the intellectual foundations for 
Canadian nationality.2 While this movement was short lived, succeeding organizations 
recognized the potential o f achieving national outlooks and goals through the education 
system. All failed however to enlist the support o f successive federal governments who were 
dedicated to a narrow interpretation of S. (93) o f the Constitution which clearly delineates 
education as a provincial responsibility. Exclusive provincial jurisdiction was diluted 
however by the constitutional responsibility given to the federal government for the 
education o f Native Peoples, federal prisoners, military personnel and citizens living in the 
federally governed territories. Additionally the federal government was given the power to
lJohn N. Grant, "The Educational Role o f the Federal Government," in Ian Winchester 
(ed.) The Independence of the University and the Funding o f the State: Essavs on Academic 
Freedom in Canada. (Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto, 1989), p. 25.
2J.L. Finlay, andD.N. Sprague, The Structure o f  Canadian History. (Prentice-Hall Canada 
Inc. Scarborough, 1984), pp. 190-93.
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intervene on behalf of provincial religious minorities.
Despite these mandates, the federal government tried to avoid becoming involved in 
the educational disputes o f the late 1900's. This is perhaps best illustrated by the Manitoba 
Schools Question, when the Liberal government o f Wilfrid Lairier subjugated its 
responsibilities to protect the educational rights of provincial minorities to the desire to reach 
a compromise with the Manitoba government. According to John Grant the federal 
government's abrogation of responsibility had two consequences. First, the courts have 
replaced it as the arbitrator o f  disputes concerning the constitution and education. Also, the 
failure of the federal government to constitutionally assert itself in the Manitoba case left it 
with little influence in the face of maturing and determined provincial governments.3 
Direct Federal Involvement
While there is no constitutional federal presence in education, there are, according 
to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, some basic elements of 
national responsibility pertaining to education present in Canada as in all modem states. 
National governments justifiably view education as a national interest for the following 
reasons:
• education is a right o f each citizen, irrespective o f their place of 
residence;
• standards maintained by educational institutions are o f national 
interest due to the fact that the technical, economic, and social well 
being of society depends on them;
• unity o f educational systems is a national interest, in order to 
maintain and guard the freedom of choice (via mobility) of citizens;
• the educational philosophy of an educational system and the 
principles underlying its operation are matters of national interest,
3Grant, "Role o f the Federal Government," pp. 26-27.
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because cultural and national consciousness depend on it.4 
Each of these national interests necessitates some participation by the national government. 
In Canada federal involvement in education has grown since Confederation and can be 
examined by using the three justifications most often employed to defend it: education and 
employment, education and culture, and education and language.5 
Roval Commissions and their impact on public policy
Before we begin our chronological examination, it is important to point out the 
importance of Royal Commissions and Parliamentary or Senate Task Forces on policy 
development in Canada. This chapter will demonstrate how important they have been to 
federal involvement in post-secondary education. One author refers to Royal Commissions 
as "an ancient and venerable executive technique for fact finding, information gathering, 
public-opinion sampling, policy initiative and policy delay."6 Commissions and task forces 
can provide background information and analyses on a particular sector o f society to the 
government. They assist in raising public awareness about an issue and can convey the 
message that the government is taking a serious look at an issue. They have the power to 
conduct public hearings, call for papers and call witnesses. Royal Commissions have been: 
either investigatory or policy oriented.
When commissions submit their recommendations they are filtered through existing 
political, administrative and societal structures, and therefore reactions can be conflictual.
4OECD, Reviews o f National Policies for Education: Canada. (OECD, 1976), p. 90.
5John N. Grant, "The Educational Role o f the Federal Government," p. 28.
6Audrey D. Doerr. The Machinery o f Government in Canada. fMethuen. Toronto, 1981), 
p. 149.
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Governments are therefore selective in accepting or rejecting individual recommendations. 
As we shall see, in the area o f post-secondary education, governments have relied heavily 
on the reports of royal commissions, task forces and other reports from interested parties.
Chronologically, federal involvement can roughly be divided into three periods. The 
first period covers the years 1867-1910, and was a period o f minimum federal participation; 
the second period covers the years between 1910-1950, which saw federal involvement 
grow; the third period covers the years from 1950 to the present which saw the greatest 
growth in both the post-secondary sector, and federal involvement.
While the first period involved minimum federal participation, it witnessed the first 
incursion by the federal government into the education field, justified by the link between 
education and employment. Although the constitution had defined education as a provincial 
responsibility, it was not entireiy clear in the early years what the limits o f this distribution 
would turn out to be. The federal government was not challenged in 1874 when under 
S.91(7), it passed legislation establishing the Royal Military College in Kingston, to train 
Canadians as army officers.7 Again in 1885 the federal government provided 150, 000 acres
J
as a land endowment to the University o f Manitoba "for capital expenditures and ... a 
permanent source of revenue for the university."8
The second period of involvement was ushered in shortly after the turn o f the 
centuryriricTeased urbanization ana industrialization, along with a shortage o f workers in
7David M. Cameron, More than an Academic Question: Universities. Government and 
Public Policy in Canada. (Institute for Research in Public Policy, Halifax, 1991), p. 20.
Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Provincial Relations, Fiscal Federalism in Canada, 
1981, p. 55.
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agriculture and skilled manufacturing workers, led to pressures on the federal government 
for educational support. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association (CMA), prompted by its 
concern for technical education, was one of the early supporters of federal involvement. The 
CMA and local trade boards believed that the federal government had both the financial 
resources to undertake such education, and the responsibility for providing the economic 
requirements for nation building, (under S. 91), which they interpreted to include a federal 
role in technical and vocational education.9 The federal government in the meantime had 
become concerned with agricultural education, which, as agriculture was a shared 
jurisdiction between the two levels o f government, they felt they had an interest in it.
Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Technical Education.
The combination o f the demand for both technical and agricultural education, and 
their intimate relationship to the economic health and growth o f the nation, led to the 
establishment o f the Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Technical Education in 
1910. Although established by the federal government, the Royal Commission had the 
support o f all nine provincial governments. N ot waiting for the Commission's report, the 
federal government introduced the Agricultural Aid Act in 1912 and the Agricultural 
Instruction Act in 1913. The latter of these Acts provided grants to the provinces, on a per 
capita basis to support instruction in agriculture. It was the first shared-cost program based 
on a per capita basis.10
Additionally, on the recommendation o f the Royal Commission, the first Technical
9Grant, "The Educational Role o f the Federal Government, "p.29.
10Cameron, More than an Academic Question, p. 31.
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Education Act was passed in 1919, under which Ottawa provided funding to individual 
provinces for technical education in their jurisdictions. Unlike the earlier Agricultural Acts 
which some constitutional justification, the Technical Education Act was ground breaking 
because it applied the principle o f federal intervention in one constitutionally restricted area 
in order to fulfil its constitutional responsibility in another.11
During World War I, the federal government moved into the related field of research. 
Primarily due to the desire to co-ordinate government research programs, the National 
Research Council was established in 1916 and was concerned initially with industrial 
research and development, but it quickly began to fund pure research in universities. From 
1919 to the end of the Second World War, the federal government passed several pieces of 
legislation involving employment education, training, and vocational assistance, including 
the 1937 Unemployment and Agricultural Assistance Act, which was negotiated with the 
provinces on a cost-sharing basis; the 1939 Youth Training Act and the Student Aid 
Program; the 1942 Vocational Training Act, which provided for the training of discharged 
servicemen; and the 1945 Veteran’s Rehabilitation Act, which paid the tuition of veterans 
who attended university or college.
The RoweU-Sirois Commission
With the onset o f the Depression, the provinces had difficulties managing the social 
costs o f the economic downturn. This led to the appointment o f the Royal Commission on 
Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois Commission). While the Commission was 
highly critical o f shared-cost or conditional grant programs, it did suggest the possibility of
“ Grant, "The Educational Role o f the Federal Government," p.29.
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federal support for universities:
... even the provinces might welcome a small Dominion grant to their 
universities made contingent on the maintenance over a period of some years 
of the provincial grants to the same institutions and on the preservation of 
high academic standards.12
Rowell-Sirois expressed concern for equality of educational opportunity across the nation
and suggested that the federal government address the existing disparity by a system of
direct grants to universities, and scholarships and bursaries to students.
While the Commission was still deliberating, the federal government introduced the
Dominion-Provincial Student Aid Program under the Youth Training Act 1939, which
provided conditional grants to provinces for student loans. Within the year agreements were
signed with five provinces under the Program: these were British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Prince Edward Island. The other provinces soon followed,
with Quebec joining in 1940, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia in 1942, Ontario in 1944,
and Newfoundland in 1949. While the Program supported a variety of provincial student aid
arrangements, including grants, loans or both, the federal government's assessment of the
programme was that it was modest in scope, and had little impact on higher education during
the early 1940's due to demands o f WWII.13
As we have seen so far, the federal government became involved in the field of
education at first hesitantly in the first phase o f our analysis, and later with more enthusiasm
l2Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report. (Ottawa, King's Printer, 
1940), Book II, p. 52.
13Canada. Department o f the Secretary of State o f Canada, Federal and Provincial 
Support to Post-Secondarv Education in Canada. A Report to Parliament. 1984-85 (Queen's 
Printer, Ottawa, 1985), p. 2.
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during the second phase. It is significant also to note that the provincial governments were 
willing participants in federal activities during these early initiatives. However, the federal 
government could defend its position by stating that involvement to this point had always 
flowed from either constitutional jurisdiction as in the military academies and agricultural 
colleges, or the connection between education and economic development and employment 
which economic groups were justifying on the grounds of section 91 o f the Constitution. 
W orld W a r n
The Second World War had a profound effect on education in Canada. During the 
war the National Council of Canadian Universities (NCCU) developed a close working 
relationship with the federal government relating to the war effort. The universities provided 
and trained technicians and professionals as well as performing scientific and military 
research. The federal government increased its involvement in science and research, 
establishing both the Defence Research Board and Atomic Energy o f Canada, both spin offs 
o f the National Research Council, during the war.
As the war drew to an end, the federal government at the urging o f the NCCU, agreed 
to  provide for the university education o f returning veterans. A 1941 federal Order-in- 
Council provided extensive educational benefits for veterans. The 1945 Veterans’ 
Rehabilitation Act further supported veterans' peacetime university education by paying not 
only the tuition fees but also an additional S I50 per veteran to the university concerned. 
These provisions marked the beginning o f  direct federal financial assistance to universities.14
The "veteran bulge" substantially altered Canada's universities. Thousands of
“ Secretary of State, Report to Parliament. 1985, p. 3.
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returning veterans availed themselves o f the opportunity and, in 1945-46 alone over 20,000 
veterans entered the universities, a 46% increase in total enrollment. The following year 
veteran enrollment peaked, at 35,000, which represented 44% o f total university students.13 
As the table below indicates enrolment in the university system skyrocketed over this period 
o f time.
Full-Time Post-Secondary Enrolments, Canada, by Level 1951-52 to 1991-92
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S o u rc e : Secretary o f S ta te  (1991). figure 1.1, p a g e  1. Statistics Canada (1991a), 
table 2  page 19.
After years o f poverty, the universities felt they had reached a degree o f financial 
security, but this was short lived. Operating funds provided were intended to address the 
immediate needs o f the veterans, and limited funds were available for building projects. 
Once the last o f the veterans had passed through the system, the universities returned to their 
previous state o f "genteel poverty."16 While the veterans' bulge was significant, civilian
Cameron, More Than an Academic .Question p.44
16Paul Axelrod, Scholars and Dollars, p. 19-20.
/ .
//
/  .
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enrollment was also rising rapidly, and was to a degree masked by the veteran influx. 
Civilian enrollment increased from 36,000 in 1941-42 to 61,000 in 1951-52, almost a 70% 
increase.17
Canadian universities in the post-war era were faced with renewed financial
pressure. Veteran enrolment was diminishing, leading to a corresponding loss in federal
assistance at a time of rising costs and rising civilian enrolment.18 The special relationship
that had developed between the NCCU and the federal government led many university
administrators, at least in English-speaking Canada, to seek a solution through continued
federal support. The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and
Sciences (Massey Commission) established in 1949 provided a convenient vehicle for
promoting such a policy.
The Massev Commission
The Massey Commission’s 1951 Report and the government response to it ushered
in the modem era o f  federal support for post-secondary education. Government responses
in this era were initially based on cultural grounds, as the Massey Commission reflected a
growing concern for Canadian cultural awareness and national identity. It linked education
to culture, and drew a strong connection between culture and the universities.
The universities are provincial institutions; but they are much more than that.
... They also serve the national cause in so many ways, direct and indirect, 
that theirs must be regarded as the finest o f contributions to national strength
17Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, p. 45.
18Secretary of State, Report to Parliament. 1982. p. 3
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and unity."19
The Commission lamented the financial crisis facing universities and concluded that a 
federal role was necessary to achieve equality o f opportunity in the economic, social and 
cultural life of Canada. The Commission went on to advocate per capita federal grants to 
universities.20
The federal government responded to the Massey Commission and appeals by the
NCCU in June 1951 when Prime Minister St. Laurent announced in the House o f Commons
the provision o f $7.1 million in direct grants to universities on a 50 cents per capita basis.
In reference to the new grants, the Prime Minister stated ,"... it is in the national interest to
take immediate action to assist the universities to perform functions which are quite essential
to the country ..."21 The grants were intended as a supplement to, not a replacement of,
provincial funding and were designed to
... assist the universities to maintain the highly qualified staffs and the 
working conditions which are essential for the proper performance of their 
- functions—in other words, to maintain quality rather than to increase existing
facilities.22
Although initially accepted by all provinces, Premier Duplessis o f Quebec instructed 
Quebec universities in 1952 not to accept the grants. His rejection of federal money was 
based on the grounds that both the Massey Commission and the federal grants were an
I9Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, Report. 
(Ottawa, King's Printer, 1951), p. 132. (referred to subsequently as the Massey Commission)
20Massey Commission, Report, p. 355.
21Canada, House o f Commons, Debates. 4th session, 1st Parliament, p.4278.
-Ibid., p. 4278.
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unconstitutional federal intrusion into Quebec affairs. The Quebec government felt it would
be more in keeping with the terms of Confederation if the federal government returned to the
provinces all the direct tax fields which it had "rented" during the war.2* Unhappy with the
federal response of tax sharing, Quebec introduced its own individual income tax system.
In addition, the province withdrew from the Dominion-Provincial Student Aid Program.
The direct federal grants did not conflict with provincial policy only in Quebec.
Since confederation Ontario had refused public funding to church-related institutions. This
policy was openly breached by the federal grants which were paid to all universities and
colleges regardless o f denominational status.
The cultural justification for federal activity was extended, as recommended by the
Massey Report, to other educational or quasi-educational activities. This led to the
establishment o f  the Canada Council (delayed until 1957) which would operate on behalf of
the arts, humanities and social sciences, the way the National Research Council had done for
the natural sciences and engineering since 1916. It also resulted in federal support for the
Public Archives o f Canada, the National Library, the National Museum, the National Film
Board and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Such institutions, including the Canada
Council and National Research Council, according to John Grant, could be considered as
forming a non-degree-granting national education system as they
... preserve and develop intellectual skills, protect and generate knowledge, 
produce and publish the results o f their research and help to maintain the 
national culture, thus fulfilling many o f the traditional functions of the
23 Grant, "Role o f the Federal Government," p. 31.
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university.24
The development of culture continues to be an important reason for federal involvement in 
education.
Demand for post-secondary education continued to escalate throughout the decade 
o f the 1950's, stimulated by a number o f economic and social pressures. While the 
population in general was increasing, the participation rate in post-secondary education was 
also shifting upward, reflecting the higher value society had come to place on education and 
a highly qualified workforce. Projections o f continued increases in enrollment, coupled with 
the fact that faculty and staff numbers, and wages, had not kept pace with enrollment caused 
increased concern. The consensus o f university presidents was that more money was 
needed. As they prepared for their National Conference in 1956, the federal government was 
the principal target for funding appeals by the NCCU, based on past successes. The NCCU's 
approach showed a lack of sensitivity towards the universities in Quebec and the prohibition 
they faced regarding acceptance o f federal grants. The NCCU also did not provide great 
insight into the constitutional implications o f direct federal involvement in higher education
'v,
or the political consequences of further isolating Quebec. The issue in Quebec was clearly 
spelled out by the Tremblay Commission, Quebec's Royal Commission of Inquiry on 
Constitutional Problems which stated in 1956;
No other federal move... has underlined to any greater extent the delicate
situation in which Ottawa’s repeated generosities for provincial purposes has
24Grant, "The Educational Role o f the Federal Government," p. 31
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placed Quebec.25
The National Conference organized by NCCU in November 1956 involved business,
government and university leaders. At the conclusion of the conference Prime Minister St.
Laurent made two announcements. The first doubled the federal fimds for operating grants
to universities from 50 cents to $1.00 per capita and the second established the Canada
Council (originally proposed by the Massey Commission), whose budget included funding
for university capital construction. More importantly, the Prime Minister defended the
constitutional legitimacy o f federal grants to universities based on his interpretation of the
spending power of the federal parliament.
The federal government has the absolute right to use indirect taxation for any 
purpose, and the right to impose direct taxation provided that it is destined 
to increase Canada's Consolidated Revenue Fund. With the approval of 
Parliament, it can then use this money to make gifts or grants-in-aid to 
individuals, institutions, provincial governments, or even foreign 
governments. This is a royal prerogative which our constitution does not 
limit in any way.26
In an attempt to assuage the situation in Quebec, the federal government announced 
that operating grants would no longer be paid directly to universities, but to the NCCU as 
an intermediary agency, for distribution to member institutions. This would, it was felt, 
increase the capacity and incentive o f Quebec's universities to put pressure on their 
provincial government, to allow them to accept the grant since they would not be accepting
R ep o rt of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, (1956), p. 180, 
as quoted in Cameron p: 63.
26Speech by Prime Minister St. Laurent, November 12, 1956, quoted in Pierre Elliott 
Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians. (Macmillan o f Canada, Toronto, 1968), p. 
85.
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grants from the federal government, but from a "buffer agency" o f their own constitution. 
The NCCU lacked the legal status to play this role and set up a separate executive body, the 
Canadian Universities Foundation. At the same time the NCCU became the National 
Council o f Canadian Universities and Colleges (NCCUC). Once again as an appeasement 
to Quebec, any university which failed to accept funds would have them held in trust by the 
NCCU/CUF.
Prime Minister St. Laurent faced stiff opposition in Quebec over the grants, not only 
from Premier Duplessis, but also from a young university professor, Pierre Trudeau. 
Trudeau maintained that in attempting to allay fears that there was any "encroachment upon 
the provincial legislature's exclusive jurisdiction in the field o f education"27 and by 
administering the grants through the NCCU, the federal government was in fact taking great 
pains to make it clear that it did not wish to be responsible for universities at all. Trudeau 
also pointed out that in a speech given weeks before the conference, the Prime Minister had 
stated that provincial authorities have the exclusive right to legislate in matters of 
education.28 The circumvention tactic did not placate Quebec and their share o f funds was 
deposited by the NCCUC/CUF. V-
This was a period o f virtual revolution for higher education in Canada as exhibited 
by its massive physical expansion, growing autonomy for junior and affiliated colleges, 
transformation o f denominational colleges into public universities and community pressure
27Pierre E. Trudeau, Federalism Canada and the French Canadians p. 83.
28Ibid.
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for new institutions in cities without either a college or university.29 In the decade between 
1957-1967 the Canada Council distributed over $60 million under its University Capital 
Grants program, while during the same period the Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation provided universities with loans for the building of student residences.30
Enrollment figures continued to increase throughout the 1950's. From 1954-55 to 
1959-60 enrolment increased 51%, combined with a 42% increase in faculty, which resulted 
in operating expenses almost doubling.31 The principal source o f funds for these expansions 
was the federal government as the federal proportion of operating grants increased from 14% 
in 1954-1955 to nearly 22% in 1959-1960. Provincial shares on the other hand dropped 
from over 40% to just over 35%.32 The remainder of funding came from student tuition, 
corporate and private gifts, and alumni contributions.
The Quebec Problem
The growing dependence o f universities on federal grants aggravated the situation 
in Quebec where universities were refusing grants. As mentioned previously, Quebec's 
arguments were based on a constitutional objection to the grants themselves. This had two 
consequences: first, Quebec residents had to pay both federal and provincial taxes, and 
secondly the universities and colleges could not keep up with their counterparts in other
29Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, p. 68.
30Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, Federal Policy on Post-Secondarv 
Education, (March 1987) p. 4.
31 According the David Cameron operating expenditures almost doubled in those five 
years from $76.million to $143 million, (pp.81-82).
32Camerbn, More Than an Academic Question, p. 83.
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provinces which received both federal and provincial funding. Premier Duplessis argued for 
a full abatement o f federal taxes for Quebec, arguing the federal government could afford 
to forego additional revenue since it evidently had excess funds going to subsidize 
institutions within provincial jurisdiction. In the mean time the ability of the universities to 
continue to refuse the grants was weakening. In 1958 a small denominational college 
claimed its grant and again in 1959 another small college claimed its share.
In July 1959 the Federal Minister of Finance, the Honourable Donald Fleming, stated 
in reference to the way in which university grants were payable "... it must be recognized by 
all that the present situation cannot continue".33 There must be some way to make grants 
intended for Quebec available to universities.
With the death in 1959 o f Premier Duplessis, there was a new willingness in Ottawa 
and Quebec to find a solution to the intergovernmental impasse. The solution agreed upon 
would have profound significance for public policy responsibility for higher education in 
Canada. The federal government agreed to increase the tax abatement for corporate 
taxpayers in Qusbec by one per cent beginning in 1960, and to terminate grants to the 
universities in Quebec. The revenue from the abatements would be topped up using 
equalization transfers to ensure Quebec would get the same funds as if it were receiving 
grants. In return Quebec reached an agreement with its universities whereby the universities 
would be free to accept the federal grants for 1959-60, but beginning in 1960 the province 
would provide grants to universities valued at $1.75 per capita. The universities would 
accept the funds held in trust by NCCUC since 1957 (some $26 million), but turn them over
33Hansard, July 18, 1959, p. 6393.
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to the provincial treasury. The province agreed to establish a capital fond of $175 million 
with which to finance university expansion. The universities would also be entitled to accept 
entitlements from the Canada Council capital grants fond.
The resolution of the "Quebec Problem1', according tc  David Cameron, signalled a 
dramatic change in the role of the provincial government. Historically, education, higher 
education in particular, had been left to the responsibility o f private groups and the church 
in Quebec. The provincial state, after two hundred years, quite suddenly moved to centre 
stage. This development was not restricted to Quebec, as Cameron points out, every 
provincial government, was drawn into responsibility for managing and financing what 
would soon be viewed as provincial systems o f post-secondary education.34
The 1960's brought further increases in enrolment due in large part to increased 
participation rates for women. Economic reports claimed that enormous returns for both 
individuals and society as a whole could be expected from more investment in higher 
education.35 Real economic growth seemed to confirm this relationship, which raised
j _
questions about federal responsibility for economic management and involvement 'r ift 
advanced education and training.
Provincial governments generally agreed that university capacity should expand to 
meet the increasing student demand. However this would require a more active provincial 
presence in the designing and financing o f universities and colleges. In Ontario for instance,
34Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, p. 86. .
35Economic Council o f Canada, First Annual Review: Economic Goals for Canada. (EEC, 
1960).
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then Minister of University Affairs William Davis, stated that the provincial government 
would no longer be willing to allow respect for academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy to either dictate or frustrate public policy objectives. In a 1966 speech at York 
University, he stressed the need to balance university obligations to society, financial support 
from government and university autonomy, and called for greater co-operation and co­
ordination among universities. This co-operation must also extend to intergovernmental 
relations. In recognizing a federal dimension to post-secondary education he cautioned that
...any federal action must be taken as part o f an integrated approach to higher 
education—an approach in which provincial policy is paramount.36
Table 1
FEDERAL PER CAPITA CONTRIBUTIONS AND PER STUDENT VALUES37 
Fiscal Year Per Capita Per Student
Contribution Value
1951-52 $ .50 $ 120
1956-57 $ 1.00 $221
1958-59 $ 1.50 $289
1962-63 $2.00 $299
1965-66 $2.00 $210
Federal grants continued to play a major and expanding role in support o f 
universities. Over a decade the per capita value o f the grants had quadrupled, while the per
36Commission to Study the Development o f Graduate Programmes in Ontario 
Universities, Report. (Toronto, Committee on University Affairs, 1966), p. 77.
37TabIe composed from data in David Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, 
pp. 67 and 117.
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student value had increased by a modest 43%.38 In addition, the federal government had 
continued to be the principal source o f support for university research since the 
establishment of the National Research Council, and by the 1960’s was accounting for 60% 
of the total. Provincial support by 1965-66 was still only 15 per cent of the total.39
Further federal involvement in post-secondary education began in 1964 when the 
Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) replaced the Dominion-Provincial Student Aid 
Program of 1939, which as noted above was modest in scope. The purpose of the CSLP was 
to make financial help available to students who required financial assistance to obtain a 
post-secondary education. The Loan Program was a model o f co-operation: the banks made 
loans, and the provinces administered the program, (eligibility requirements therefore were 
established by each province). It was an arrangement easily defended under sections 91(15) 
and 91(19) respecting federal authority over banking and credit. The Act provided an opting 
out provision and equal compensation to those provinces with comparable provincial 
programs. Only Quebec took advantage of this provision. The Canada Student Loan 
Program is regarded as a model o f governmental co-operation and accommodation. Federal 
funds have ensured a substantial degree of interprovincial equity and mobility, while a 
decentralized administration has recognized different provincial circumstances and priorities. 
Quebec’s opting out, since the beginning, has been with equivalent federal transfer of funds 
and has not interfered with intergovernmental consultation and accommodation. This 
represents a more sophisticated accommodation o f the realities o f Canadian federalism than
38Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, p. 117.
39Ibid„ 119.
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the extra-constitutional program of direct federal grants to universities, even with the belated 
contracting out provision for Quebec.40
Perhaps as a legacy of the close relationship developed during and after WWII, or 
perhaps merely motivated by self interest, Canada's university community continued to 
favour increased direct federal participation. This opinion was not limited to university 
community as three major reports were issued in 1 £64-1965 which encouraged this view.
The first commission was the Royal Commission on Health Services, chaired by Mr. 
Justice Emmett Hall. It encouraged national financial assistance to provinces to 
accommodate the education o f health professionals, and capital expansion of medical and 
dental schools.41 The second commission was the NCCU-appointed Commission on the 
Financing of Higher Education in Canada, chaired by Dr. Vincent Bladen. It reported in 
1965, stating that governments must respond to public demands for education. "The people 
demand it; our economic growth requires it; our governments must take the action necessary 
to implement it."42 The commission concluded that the federal government was the only one 
able to provide the financial resources to cover the projected enrollment increases, and 
recommended massive increases in federal grants, both operational and capital.43 It also 
recommended the appointment o f a Minister o f the Crown to be responsible for assistance
40Cameron, p. 122 1
41Royal Commission on Health Sendees, Report. (Queen’s Printer, Ottawa, 1964), pp. 68- 
75. (x
42Vincent W. Bladen et al. Financing Higher Education in Canada. (Report o f  a 
Commission to the Association o f Universities and Colleges o f Canada, Toronto, University 
o f Toronto Press, 1965), p 20.
43Bladen Report p. 40.
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to the universities.44
The NCCUC, once again with a new name, the Association of Universities and
Colleges o f Canada (AUCC), not surprisingly endorsed the Bladen Report. The Prime
Minister acknowledged the fiscal capacities o f the provinces were not equal.
"In order that the opportunities for higher education should be adequately 
improved for all Canadians, ... federal financing must be brought to the 
assistance of the provinces. My government has already accepted this federal 
responsibility."45
The third major study, the Deutsch Report was the second annual review of the 
Economic Council o f Canada, and it reported in December 1965. Chaired by Dr. John 
Deutsch, this report set forth the most forceful case in favour o f increased expenditures on 
higher education. Based on studies o f the economic returns from investments in education 
the council estimated that "the returns on the 'human investment1 in high school imd 
university education in Canada are in the range of 15 to 20 per cent per year, with slighily 
higher rates for ... a university education."46 It was these economic benefits that made 
education a matter o f direct concern to the federal government, and education should 
therefore be a high priority for government.
Bolstered by these new reports, the federal government announced in January 1966 
that it would increase the grants to universities from $2.00 per capita to $5.00 per capita. In 
July o f the same year the federal government moved to implement one of the central
^Bladen Report, p. 67.
4SAssociation of Universities and Colleges Canada, University Affairs. (7:2, December 
1965), p. 6. Cited in Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, p. .126.
^Economic Council o f Canada, Second Annual Review: Towards Sustained and 
Balanced Economic Growth. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), p. 90.
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recommendations of the Hall Commission by creating the Health Resources Fund which 
would grant funds over a 15 year period for capital construction o f health training and 
research facilities. David Cameron contends that in contrast to the Canada Student Loan 
Program, the Health Resources Fund stands as "a monument to the propensity of conditional 
grants to distort provincial and institutional priorities and to blur expenditures 
accountability."47 He argues that while the increase in medical education at the time was 
critical for the federal government as it prepared to introduce publicly funded medical c -re, 
provincial and university priorities were skewed in favour of by far the most expensive 
programs.
There was increased concern among the provinces regarding direct federal support 
to universities. The provinces did not move to substitute increased federal grants for 
provincial grants. The shares o f university operating expenditures borne by federal and 
provincial grants remained steady during the 1960-61 through 1965-66 period at 40 and 20 
percent respectively, while students fees remained at 25% o f operating expenditures.48 The 
remaining fifteen per cent was covered by alumni gifts, investment income and private 
grants. The federal government, primarily as a response to the Bladen Report's 
recommendation for a federal minister responsible for higher education, established the 
Education Support Branch within the Department o f the Secretary o f State.49
The prospect of a federal office o f education was anathema to the provinces and they
47David Cameron, More than an Academic Question, p. 128.
48Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, p. 128.
49Canada. Standing Senate Committee on National Finance. Federal Policy on Post- 
Secondary Education. (Minister o f  Supply and Services, Ottawa, March 1987).
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were finally galvanized into action. The provincial ministers o f education had for years
constituted an informal committee of the Canadian Education Association. In response to
federal actions they established a formal interprovincial organization: the Council of
Ministers of Education, Canada. The council would enable provincial ministers of education
to consult and cooperate on matters of common interest.
The Secretary of State administered the last o f  the per capita payments to universities
in 1966-67. At a conference o f First Ministers in 1966 Prime Minister Pearson
acknowledged provincial constitutional responsibility for education. He also however
reiterated the federal government's commitment to the importance of education:
...education is obviously a matter o f profound importance to the economic 
and social growth o f  the country as a whole. ... Apart altogether from the 
general interest in fostering equality of opportunity for Canadians ... the 
federal government has specific and particular responsibilities to which 
higher education is relevant.50
There was a recognition on the part of the federal government that direct grants had provided
little incentive for the provinces to expand their own support for post-secondary education.51
Under the 1967 Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, payments would be made
directly to the provinces, on a shared-cost basis. Federal transfers to the provinces amounted
to either $15 per capita o f provincial population or 50 per cent of eligible operating
expenditures, whichever was greater. Fiscal transfers consisted of a transfer o f taxing power
) ! - 
1 50Statement by the Prime Minister at the Federal-Provincial Meeting (October 24, 1966) 
as quoted in the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, Federal Policy on Post- 
Secondarv Education, p. 6.
51 James Cutt, Universities and Government: A Framework for Accountability. (Institute 
for Research on Public Policy, Halifax), p. 64.
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and a cash adjustment payment to bring the total transfer up to each province's entitlement.52
This arrangement was an attempt to increase expenditure on post-secondary 
education, while acknowledging provincial jurisdiction. The provinces had the advantage 
o f asserting their constitutional jurisdiction and were assured of substantial revenue gains. 
The payment of 50 per cent of the costs by the federal government "recognised implicitly 
the concept o f a national interest or purpose."53 However, the federal government soon 
discovered it had lost control over its own expenditures. Costs under the cost-sharing rose 
rapidly, averaging over 20 per cent per year for the first three years.54 Another hazard o f the 
program was that per capita payments were greater to the "have" provinces who could afford 
to expand their post-secondary education systems more quickly. The Act was revised in 
1972 limiting the national rate o f annual increase o f the total federal contribution to 15 per 
cent. The Act was extended through 1976-77.55
Education and language, the third major basis for federal involvement in education 
emerged in the 1960's. Language is usually considered part o f culture, but it has so 
dominated the politics o f Canada that it has acquired both a separate and special status. 
Once again acting on the recommendations of a Royal Commission, the Official Languages 
in Education Directorate was established in 1970 within the Department o f the Secretary o f
52Secretary o f State, Support to Education by the Government o f Canada. (Minister o f 
Supply and Services, 1983), p. 10.
53James Cutt, Universities and Government, p. 66.
54Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, Federal Policy on Post-Secondary 
Education, p. 7.
55Stahding Senate Committee, p. 8.
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State, in response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism. The Official Languages in Education program was established in 1970 to 
provide financial support to provinces and territories for minority official language education 
and second official language instruction at the elementary, secondary and post-secondary 
education level. This was part o f Prime Minister Trudeau’s attempt to appease Quebec and 
offset the rising nationalism within the province. Language has remained an important 
factor in the federal governments role in post-secondary education.
By the 1970's expansion of post-secondary education had moderated. The passing 
o f the 1977 Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing 
Act (EPF) changed the principle of federal financial support for post-secondary education, 
hospital insurance and medical care. Funding was now in the form of unconditional block 
grants to each provincial government, based on a complicated formula o f tax points and 
transfer payments with increases tied to GNP, and not to costs.
The change from shared-cost programs to the conditional grant system was instigated 
because the existing program served the needs of neither government. Faced with the 
escalating costs of higher education and the persistent provincial resistance to the shared-cost 
program, the federal government proposed replacing the conditional grant with the block 
grant. Established Program Financing allowed the federal government to minimize 
provincial dissatisfaction and at the same time to control its expenditure on post-secondary 
education.56
56Terry Yuk Shing Wu, "Federal Contributions to Postsecondary Education Under the 
Established Programs Financing: Trends and Implications," Canadian Journal of Higher 
Education. (15:1, 1985), pp. 19-20.
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The Act had to be renegotiated every five years, and by the end of the first term there
was already some dissatisfaction. While the unconditional nature of the grants meant that the
provinces were not tied to spending a specific amount on post-secondary education, in the
federal government's eyes, about one third o f  the monies were to be used for education.
However under EPF the incentive for provinces to contribute to post-secondary education
was greatly reduced. This has led one scholar to comment that the:
role in federal education since World War II is one o f rising expenditures 
coppied with diminishing visibility and diminishing impact. Since 1967 ... 
the provinces have been firmly in control. The 1977 amendment to the 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangements accentuated the trend begun 
ten years earlier.37
This lack of visibility and accountability inherent in EPF, has led the federal government to 
"tinker" with the EPF formula. In 1982, Bill C-97 amended the original 1977 Act which 
resulted in a net decrease in the transfers. Again in 1984, the legislation was amended and 
the post-secondary education portion was limited under the Trudeau government's six and 
five anti-inflation programme.
Once again there was a multitude o f commissions and reports which provided 
justification for the federal government’s actions. In 1985, A.W. Johnson produced a report 
prepared for the Secretary o f State which demonstrated that the federal share of total costs 
o f post-secondary education had risen, while the province's share had fallen. In fact the 
Johnson Report points to five provinces where federal transfer payments actually exceeded
57Peter Leslie, Canadian Universities 1980 and Beyond: Enrolment. Structural Change 
and Finance. (AUCC Policy Study No. 3., September 1980), p. 146.
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the total amount of provincial grants to post-secondary education.58 In these provinces, 
according to James Cutt, the partnership between the two levels o f government in support 
of post-secondary education had been replaced by federal funding, and the balance had been 
seriously eroded in the other provinces.59
Table 2
Federal Contributions to EPF
Post-Secondary Education Portion
Cash Transfer and Tax Points, 1987/88-1992/9360 
(millions o f dollars)
Year Cash Transfer Tax Transfer Total
1987/88 2, 199 2, 882 5, 081
1988/89 2, 223 3, 151 5, 374
1989/90 2, 259 3, 463 5,722
1990/91 2, 126 3, 629 5, 755
1991/92 1, 873 3,983 5, 856
1992/93 1, 912 4,062 5, 974
The Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements (the Breau 
Committee), recommended the separation o f EPF transfers for health and post-secondary 
education, setting a formula o f 67.9% for health and 32.1% for post-secondary education.
58Albert W. Johnson, Giving Greater Point and Purpose to  the Federal Financing of Post- 
Secondary Education and Research in Canada. (Department o f the Secretary o f State of 
Canada, February, 1985), p. 33.
59James Cutt, Universities and Government: A Framework for Accountability. (Institute 
for Research on Public Policy), p. 66.
^ . A .  Jennes and M.C. McCracken, Review of the Established Programs Financing 
System. (Prepared for the Ministry o f Intergovernmental Affairs, Government of Ontario 
by Infometrica Limited, October 1993), p. A-9.
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This was accomplished in 1984. The 1985 Macdonald Commission was highly critical of
the EPF funding arrangements and recommended a variety of options for the federal
government to consider in its place, including a student voucher system, and tying future
federal increases to matching provincial increases.61 The Standing Senate Committee on
National Finance concluded that
federal support in respect o f post-secondary education through EPF no longer 
is beneficial; indeed, because EPF tends to blur responsibility it ought to be 
terminated.62
The Committee went on to recommend the termination o f the post-secondary portion of EPF 
and the transfer of tax points to the provinces. At the National Forum on Post-Secondary 
Education held in 1987, there was broad if not unanimous agreement on the need for 
continuing partnership between both levels o f government in supporting post-secondary 
education. There was an obvious reluctance on the part o f the federal government to 
increase contributions without some determination o f  how the money should be spent, and 
accountability for the monies.
In 1986 the Conservative government partially de-indexed the EPF escalator to two 
percent below the rate o f growth in the GNP. In 1989, the federal budget further de-indexed 
the escalator by one percent. In the 1990 budget the federal government proposed Bill C69 
which froze per capita EPF transfers for the 1990-91 and 1991-92 fiscal years, after which 
a further one percent de-indexing would take effect. The 1991 budget extended the freeze
61See the Macdonald Commission, volume 2, Chapter 18.
“ Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, Federal Policy on Post-Secondary 
Education, p. 101.
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for three years until 1994-95, freezing growth at three per cent below GNP.63 The result o f  
these freezes is that the value o f  tax transfers continue to grow at a much greater rate than 
the value o f  cash transfers. It has been predicted that by the year 2000 Quebec will receive 
no further cash transfers, and a decade later the other provinces will receive little or no cash 
payments. This is an unfortunate result as it will leave the federal government with no 
"powers o f  persuasion" in the post-secondary education field.
Indirect federal involvement
The rather lengthy overview provided above focused on the direct involvement of 
the federal government in post-secondary education. The federal government however is 
involved in a myriad of educational programs through a host of other departments other than 
the Secretary of State. Educational material offered by bilingual, bicultural and multicultural 
programs, the National Film Board, the CBC and the National Library, Museums, and 
Archives, are just the beginning. Add this to material and services offered by the 
Departments o f Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Agriculture, and National Health and 
Welfare, along with such agencies as Statistics Canada and the National Research Council, 
and it all adds up to an impressive federal contribution to the nations's education. If we 
include the federal government's involvement in citizenship education, second language 
instruction, student housing, school construction, adult education, student loans, travel and 
exchange programs and its contribution is overwhelming. It is apparent that there exists a 
largely hidden educational function performed by the federal government that has the
63AUCC Federal Support for University Education, p. 4.
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potential to influence students in elementary, secondary and post-secondary education.64 
Conclusion
While many interest groups and the provinces have welcomed federal financial 
support for education, many have claimed that the provincial authorities should set policy 
and control the spending of federal dollars. In 1951 when the federal grants system was 
initiated there was virtually no consultation with the provinces, and funds were given 
directly to each institution. Since the introduction of the 1966-67 shared cost arrangements, 
federal financing o f universities has increasingly reflected provincial sensitivities, first by 
ending direct funding to universities, and then by allowing the provinces to determine their 
level o f spending through shared-cost arrangements. The 1977 arrangements further altered 
the relationship between the federal government and post-secondary funding by increasing 
the autonomy of the provinces. Since the 1982 renegotiation of EPF, provincial authorities 
have been hungry for federal funding, but are vigilantly guarding provincial control of 
education. The federal government on the other hand, would like to cut its expenditures, 
increase its visibility in this area, and receive some form of accountability for the spending 
o f federal funds.
Provincial objections to federal involvement really began in 1952 with Premier 
Duplessis’ refusal to permit universities to accept federal funding "fearing they might cost 
us our language, our faith, our traditions.”65 Quebec has always felt that education and 
culture were linked, but national culture for Quebec was, by definition, a provincial
^John Grant, p. 34.
\ .
65Grant p. 37.
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responsibility.
Higher education has long served as a kind o f weather-vane o f Canadian federalism, 
signalling the direction in which the winds o f intergovernmental relations are blowing. It 
was in relation to agricultural education that the first federal-provincial shared-cost program 
was introduced, and it was federal grants to universities that gave rise to the first instance 
o f opting out. The 1959-60 agreement between Quebec and Ottawa, with its opting out 
ability was initially a singular status of Quebec rather that a  general decentralization o f fiscal 
power and spending responsibilities, but it was nonetheless a groundbreaking agreement. 
Higher education would play a central role when this trend surfaced again.
To return to the beginning of this chapter, our three major justifications for a federal 
role in education -employment, culture, and language - can each be argued as the legitimate 
concern o f a national government because each crosses provincial boundaries and thus 
cannot be dealt with completely within provincial jurisdictions. In 1981 Francis Fox, then 
Secretary o f State, acknowledged that the delivery o f education is an area o f provincial 
primacy, but he reaffirmed the principle o f federal involvement in education, while 
espousing accountability, visibility and national goals.
In 1983, a Secretary o f State publication listed ten objectives for federal involvement 
in education including general support, educational opportunity, mobility, employability, 
research, official languages in education, citizenship and cultural identity and the needs o f 
the federal government as an employer. This list o f objectives was dropped in the 1985 
Report to Parliament by the Secretary of State. It is interesting to note that in the same year, 
the Council of Ministers o f Education, Canada published a much shorter list o f  principles
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
to govern interaction between the two orders of government. The federal government has 
been disengaging itself from post-secondary education responsibilities, as indicated by the 
Honourable Benoit Bouchard, who as Secretary of State in 1986, stated that the real issue 
with respect to federal support "is to redefine the federal presence in a way that balances 
respect for provincial responsibilities with a need to reflect the importance of post-secondary 
education to Canada as a whole.
In the final chapter o f this thesis, we will examine the policy community and policy 
networks surrounding the post-secondary education sector. After a close examination of the 
actors and their interaction, hopefully we will be able to draw some conclusions about the 
strength, commitment and legitimacy o f the federal role in education.
“ Proceedings o f the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, First Session, 
Thirty-third Parliament, 1984-85-86, Issue No. 50, p. 6, as quoted in Standing Committee 
on National Finance, Federal Policy on Post-Secondary Education, p. 10.
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CHAEXER4 
POLICY COMMUNITIES
THE POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION SECTOR; A CASE STUDY
In the previous chapters we have examined theories o f public policy and how to 
analyse policy decisions. We have discussed, according to Simeon's framework, the 
changing environment surrounding post-secondary education in Canada, brought about by 
increasing demands m enrolment, which itself was a result o f the two World Wars, the 
Depression, industrialization and the increasing technological needs o f society and the 
economy. Along with these environmental changes there have been attitudinal changes, 
such as attitudes towards women and their role in society, and to education itself. We have 
examined the role o f federalism and how it can through legalistic interpretation constrain 
government action, while at the same time it can free governments to be creative in their 
attempt to work within constitutional strictures.
In this chapter we will examine the concept o f  policy communities and policy 
networks, and the community specifically surrounding the federal government and post- 
secondaiy education. Part o f this discussion will include the major actors, both governmental 
and societal, within this sector and their interaction with each other.
The policy community approach is very appropriate for this sector, as it involves 
bringing the state in, and analysing its abilities and political will to act. The final section o f 
this chapter then will include a brief discussion o f the strong state/weak state approach, 
leading us to a conclusion about the federal government's role in post-secondary education, 
its strength, commitment and the feasibility and advisability o f continuing its presence.
94
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Policy Comiminities.and Policy Networks
The policy community approach is indeed the "key to understanding the bulk of
policy making", for as Paul Pross has defined it, the policy community is "that part of a
political system that has acquired a dominant voice in determining government decisions in
a field o f public activity."1 These communities, populated by government agencies, pressure
groups, individuals, academics and the media, are generally permitted to create public policy
in that field. This responsibility stems from their functional responsibilities, specialized
knowledge, and vested interests.2 For this thesis Coleman and Skogstad's definition of
policy community will be used primarily because it is more specific and allows for actors
with varying degrees of influence. Coleman and Skogstad define policy communities as
those actors or potential actors with a direct or indirect interest in a policy 
area or function who share a common 'policy focus' and who, with varying 
degrees o f influence shape policy outcomes over the long run.3
The use o f the policy community/policy network approach to study the relations
between groups and the state has several advantages. This approach permits comparative
analysis within a particular sector over time, to examine changing relationships and
environmental characteristics that affect these relationships. It also permits cross-sectoral
comparison o f group-state relations. In addition, because government actors are included
within the policy community analysis, the behaviour o f the state is examined, to determine
‘Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy. (2nd ed.), (1993), p. 119.
2Ibid., p. 116.
3WilIiam Coleman and Grace Skogstad, "Policy Communities and Policy Networks: A 
Structural Approach", in Coleman and Skogstad, (eds.), Policy Communities and Public 
Policy in Canada. (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), p. 25.
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the degree of political will employed in the development and implementation of policy 
alternatives. The inclusion of state actors, interacting within a community has made this 
framework a much improved analytical tool over the society-based theories o f interest group 
activities, because it is more inclusive and more explanatory.4
The concept of policy network is used to describe the relationships among a set of 
actors that forms around a particular issue important to the policy community. So while the 
community denotes the actors, network refers to the processes o f interaction between actors.5 
Policy networks are dependent upon both the characteristics o f the policy community and 
the actions o f the state. It is a reciprocal relationship: if either the state or community 
changes, then the existing network possibly will change.6 Most policy communities consist 
of two segments, the sub-go vemment and the attentive public. The sub-government is the 
policy making body of each community and consists o f government agencies and 
institutionalized interest groups, as these alone have the incentives and resources for sub- 
government work. Because o f the exhaustive nature o f  govemment-sub-govemment work, 
sub-governments "consist o f very small groups o f people1'.7 Policy communities, tend to 
limit rather than enhance opportunities for the public to achieve major policy changes. The
4Joan Price Boase, Shifting Sands. Govemment-Group Relationships, in the Health Care 
Sector. (Institute of Public Administration o f Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, 
Kingston, 1994), p. 21.
sColeman and Skogstad, Policy Communities in Canada, p. 26
6Boase, Shifting Sands, p. 6.
7Govemment-sub-govemment work according to Pross involves almost daily
communication between government agencies and groups, involvement on advisory 
committees, invitations to comment on draft policy, participation in long range policy review 
and continual formal and informal access to agency officials. Pross, Groups Politics, p. 120.
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goal of the sub-government is to keep policy making at the routine or technical level, thereby 
minimizing interference.*
The attentive public lacks the power of the sub-government but still plays a vital 
role in policy development. It is not generally tightly knit or clearly defined, possessing a 
greater degree of mobility, or fluidity than the sub-government. Members include actors, 
government or societal, who are affected by, or interested in, policies of specific agencies. 
Generally the attentive public follows, and may even attempt to influence those policies, but 
they do not participate in policy making on a regular basis. They may, in fact, be excluded 
from it, especially if they are opposed to the general direction o f policy in existence.9 The 
attentive public maintains a perpetual policy review process, introducing an element of 
diversity inhibited at the sub-government level by the need to maintain consensus.10
Attentive public and sub-government concepts parallel what Coleman and Skogstad 
have labelled "advocacy" and "participatory" roles of groups in policy formation. Policy 
advocacy parallels the attentive public, and occurs when groups lobby the state, in an attempt 
to influence policy decisions. Effective lobbying is accomplished through the groups 
capacity to generate knowledge and information about specific policies, mobilize support, 
and maintain internal cohesion. A participatory role, on the other hand, parallels the sub- 
government, requiring that associations develop their capacity and formalize their internal
*Boase, Shifting Sands, p. 6.
^ross , Group Politics, pp. 121-125.
10Pross, Group Politics, p. 122.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
98
structures.11
The policy community surrounding post-secondary education consists of government 
and societal actors. Provincial governments and their Ministers o f Education and Finance 
are the main agencies for discussion regarding education in Canada, including post- 
secondary education. The Council o f Ministers o f Education, Canada is an 
intergovernmental institution of provincial premiers, who meet to discuss common concerns, 
and to which the Secretary o f State is occasionally invited. The Secretary of State and 
Minister o f  Finance are the major actors at the federal level. The major non-governmental 
actors include the Association of Universities and Colleges o f Canada (AUCC), the 
Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT),and the Canadian Federation of 
Students (CUS). We will discuss each o f these actors in some detail below.
Interest Groups
Paul Pross emphasizes the importance of interest groups and interest intermediation 
in the formation of public policy. As governments expanded their activities after the Second 
World War, they "... developed a warm regard for the diverse skills o f pressure groups.1'12 
This has led to a tension between sectoral and spatial representation o f interests. As 
legislatures are organized along geographically defined boundaries, neither they nor the 
party system upon which they depend, are effective vehicles for considering the needs of 
those whose interests cut across geographic barriers. Interest groups, because o f their 
concern with specific or sectoral interests ally themselves with bureaucracies concerned with
"Coleman and Skogstad, Policy Communities, p. 21.
12Paul Pross, .Group-Eolitics, (1993), p. 3.
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these interests. This has become so commonplace that main public agencies often treat 
interest groups as constituencies similar to the geographical constituencies represented in the 
legislatures.13
For our purposes an interest group will be defined as an "organization whose 
members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common 
interest."14 Interest groups have three general characteristics. First, interest groups try to 
persuade government to pursue policies that they advocate. This is dependent on a degree 
of organization, the quality of which distinguishes the interest group from the mob or 
movement. Organizational capacity permits the groups' third characteristic, the articulation 
and aggregation o f group demands.
The concept o f influence is also useful in discussing interest groups, as the perception 
o f influence affects how groups are treated by the media, other groups, politicians and 
officials and the public. Interest groups must also possess the capacity to influence policy 
which is dependent on its knowledge and capacity, its ability to mobilize resources, to form 
coalitions with other institutions and interest groups and its position as either an advocate 
or participant in a policy community.
Interest groups perform a number o f  essential functions within a political system, 
including providing a vehicle for the articulation o f members' interests and the presentation 
o f these interests to government.15 As previously stated in Chapter 1, Pross identifies such
13Ibid., p. 24.
14Ibid., p. 3.
15Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy. (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1986), 
p. 87.
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articulation as a systemic function and points out that interest groups must attempt to justify 
this self-interest by performing functions that are useful to the system at large. He identifies 
four other 'systemic functions' performed by interest groups, that meet the needs of the 
community, including communication both within their own group, with other groups and 
with government. This is a valuable function for government, for without this flow of 
communication the government would not be able to respond effectively to its environment. 
Interest groups also perform a legitimizing function, and in some sectors administrative and 
regulatory functions.16
To perform these four functions groups must possess the attributes of organization; 
formal structure, clear definition o f roles, a system for generating and allocating resources, 
a collective memory, rules governing behaviour and most important, procedures for reaching 
and implementing decisions. Using this concept o f organization, Pross develops a typology 
of interest groups which on a continuum are bounded by issue-oriented groups on one 
extreme and institutionalized groups on the other.17
Institutional groups possess a stable membership which permits organizational 
continuity and cohesion, so necessary for the monitoring o f long term policies and the 
development of new policies. A clearly defined division o f responsibilities and channels of 
communication exist which require an elaborate organizational structure. This permits the 
group to perform such functions as preparing briefs, sitting on advisory boards, rallying
1(SPross, Group Politics, pp. 88-92.
17Pross' typology is elaborated at length in his chapter "The Analysis o f Pressure Groups", 
in Group Politics pp. 108-129, especially pp. 114-119.
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membership support and public relations. In addition institutional groups need to possess an 
awareness of how government operates, which sectors of government affect their clients, and 
procedures to access these government officials.
Issue-oriented groups are on the other end of the continuum and therefore have 
limited organizational continuity and cohesion, and are usually poorly organized. Their 
knowledge o f government is minimal and frequently naive. Membership tends to be fluid 
rather than stable. They usually have difficulty in formulating and sticking to short-range 
objectives. Their primary advantage is their flexibility, as they develop quickly and are not 
hampered by a heavy organizational structure. Living on the periphery of the policy 
community as they do, they are a means of generating new ideas into the community and 
testing public reaction. In this way they enhance the adaptive capacity of the overall 
system.18
By way of contrast, institutional groups hope to achieve their goals by influencing 
the responsible agencies in their policy community. This can be a slow and cumbersome 
process as not all government agencies are equally powerful, and individual agencies often 
merely reflect the attitudes and priorities o f the government o f the day.
M ajor Plavers
Education, as previously stated is clearly delineated as a provincial jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, the federal government has long been involved in funding post-secondary 
education primarily as a result o f the fact that the allocation o f the spending power and 
access to revenue sources are not aligned in the Constitution. Since the resolution of the
I8Toid.- p. 119.
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Quebec-Ottawa impasse over federal grants to universities in 1960 (see Chapter 3), there has 
been a iramatic change in the role o f the provincial governments in the post-secondary 
education field. Combined with the 1967 changes in financing from direct grants to the 
university to shared cost conditional grants, the provincial state moved to centre stage in the 
policy community. Every provincial government was drawn into an increased role in 
managing and financing what would soon be viewed as provincial systems o f post-secondary 
education.19 The provincial governments are now quite centralized in their control over 
education, many o f them having ministries that deal specifically with post-secondary 
education. There is no doubt that government power in this sector is firmly rooted with the 
provincial governments. While acknowledging this, we still want to examine the policy 
community surrounding federal involvement in post-secondary education. The federal 
government has no formal minister o f education and its input into the system is scattered 
across a variety o f departments and ministries. There are two primary actors at the federal 
level, the Secretary of State and the Minister o f Finance.
Government Actors 
Secretary of State
With no Federal Minister to act as a lead agency, the Secretary o f State has been 
assigned the "co-ordination" o f federal policies and programs related to education. It takes 
the lead with other departments and agencies on education matters requiring coordinated 
federal action, and it cooperates with other federal departments and agencies to ensure 
effective federal-provincial consultation in all areas related to education. The Secretary o f
19Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, p. 68.
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State is also responsible for the dissemination of information on Canada's education system 
through an annual Report to Parliament and other publications. It also advises Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade on international education matters and participates, with 
provincial and other delegates, in representing Canadian interests abroad.20
This requires the Department to have many intra-departmental contacts. In addition 
however, there is an intergovernmental relations factor to consider as, under the Federal- 
Provincial Fiscal Arrangements legislation introduced in 1977, the Secretary o f State has a 
responsibility to "consult with the governments o f the provinces with regard to the 
relationship between the programs and activities o f  the governments o f Canada and o f the 
... provinces that relate to post-secondary education."21 The Department of the Secretary of 
State established the Education Support Branch in 1963 to assist the Secretary of State in 
advising the Cabinet on post-secondary education. In 1967 the branch became responsible 
for administering cash payments under the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act. It 
currently is responsible for co-ordinating federal government activity in post-secondary 
education and must provide an annual Report to Parliament on fiscal transfers to provinces 
in respect o f post-secondary education. This Report covers the expenditures of each 
province on post-secondary education along with the federal programs in support of, or 
involvement in post-secondary education. It also reports on the relationship between federal
“ Canada. Department o f the Secretary o f State. Federal-Provincial Support to Post- 
Secondary Education. A Report to Parliament 1990-91. pp. 9-10.
21Canada. Department o f the Secretary of State. Federal and Provinctal_Support to Post- 
Secondary Education in Canada. A Report to Parliament. 1984-85. (Minister of Supply and 
Services, 1985), p. 62.
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contributions and Canada's educational and economic goals. It also outlines to Parliament, 
the results of any consultations by, or on behalf of, the Secretary of State with the Council 
of Ministers o f Education, Canada, relating to the definition o f national purposes to be 
served by post-secondary education and the means by which the governments o f Canada and 
the provinces will achieve those purposes.22 In addition the department is the focal point 
federally for the development of policies and the delivery of programs respecting student 
financial assistance at the post-secondary level. In co-operation with External Affairs and 
International Trade Canada, the department contributes to the effective participation of 
Canada in international fora and activities.
The Department o f the Secretary o f State administers three principal programs in this 
field Post-Secondary Education Financing, Canada Student Loans, and Official Languages 
in Education. The Official Languages in Education Program, was established in 1970-71 at 
the recommendation o f the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. This 
program is administered by the Official Languages in Education Branch, o f the Department. 
It provides financial support to provinces and territories for minority official-language 
education, as well as second official-language instruction at the elementary, secondary and 
post-secondary levels.23 The Intergovernmental Consultative Committee on Student 
Financial Assistance within the Education Support Branch works in collaboration with the 
Secretariat of the Council o f Ministers o f Education, Canada, and attempts to co-ordinate
C anada. Department o f the Secretary o f State for Canada. Report to Parliament 1990-
21- P- 2.
^Ibid. p. 11.
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federal and provincial activities and programs in the area of student financial assistance. 
Activities include exchange and analysis o f information; the development of joint or co­
operative responses to the financial needs o f particular client groups and measures to 
enhance federal-provincial/territorial co-operation in the planning and administration of 
programs of student financial assistance.24
As part of the reorganization of the federal government in 1993, the responsibilities 
o f the Secretary o f State for student assistance and support to post-secondary education 
programs were transferred to the Minister o f  Human Resources Development. The Official 
Languages in Education program was transferred to Canadian Heritage. This further 
fractures the federal government's role in post-secondary education, and decreases its 
capacity to act in a co-ordinated fashion.
In 1992-93 the expenditures on post-secondary education in Canada totalled roughly 
$16 billion representing 2.25 per cent o f the Gross Domestic Product. This includes 
expenditures by the post-secondary institutions, government expenditures on scholarships 
and aid to students. The federal government's support for education totals roughly $8 billion 
a year, which is almost half the total expenditure. By far the largest portion of federal 
support is through the Established Programs Financing transfers, $3.5 billion in tax transfers 
(1993) and $2.6 billion in cash transfers.25 The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research 
Council, the Medical Research Council, The Social Sciences and Humanities Research
24Programs and Activities p. 27-
25Minister of Human Resources Development, Improving Social Security in Canada. 
(Summary o f discussion), (Minister of Human Resources Development, October 1994), p. 18.
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Council and the National Research Council together provide the major source o f handing for 
research in Canadian universities. Federal support for student assistance involves loans 
under the Canada Student Loan Program as well as scholarships, bursaries, grants and 
fellowships. The federal government spends roughly $500 million annually on student loans 
out of a total o f nearly $1 billion in loans and grants to students. In addition the federal 
government through the Department o f National Defence is responsible for the education of 
Armed Forces personnel. Post-secondary courses are also offered to Canadian Coast Guard 
personnel by Transport Canada. Funding is also provided to provincial and territorial 
governments for minority official-language education and second official-language 
instruction, a portion o f which relates to the post-secondary level.26
The recent discussion paper by the Minister o f  Human Resources Development, 
acknowledged the fact that cash transfers were falling and that although they currently stand 
at $2.6 billion they are falling and will disappear within 10 years. He went on the state that 
"the government would like to explore options with the provinces for a better use of these 
funds".27 This brings us to the other major government actor, the Department o f Finance. 
Departm ent of Finance
The Minister and Department of Finance occupy a position of prominence and 
influence in many policy decisions, stemming from their role as "keeper o f the public purse".
2SMinister o f Human Resources Development, Federal and Provincial Support to Post-
Secondarv Education in Canada. A Report to Parliament 1992-93. (Minister o f  Supply and 
Services, Ottawa, 1994).
27Minister o f Human Resources Development, Improving Social Security in Canada. (Human 
Resources Development, Canada, October, 1994).
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Finance officials cover a whole range of governmental activities, from fiscal policy, federal- 
provincial relations, government expenditures, tax policy, international trade and finance, 
as well as social and economic policy programs. Finance has an evaluative impact on 
departmental proposals in both economic and social policy fields. Its role in the post- 
secondary education sector is a result o f its heavy involvement in the Established Programs 
Financing, through its Federal-Provincial Relations Division.28
In the 1970’s the federal government had proposed the EPF Arrangements based on 
the assumption that the provincial level of funding would rise along with the GNP, and that 
a forum would be established to deal with post-secondary education issues that transcend 
provincial boundaries. Both assumptions were incorrect. The provincial levels of funding 
declined after the implementation o f EPF, and the CMEC rebuffed any attempts by the 
Secretary o f State to reform itself into a national forum. This led the federal government to 
consider two alternatives. The first was to accept that EPF transfers served no federal 
purpose (making them easy targets for expenditure reductions), or try to re-introduce a 
federal purpose into the transfer. The choices parallel the portfolio interest of the two 
departments principally involved, namely the Department o f Finance and the Secretary of 
State.29
While various Secretaries o f State have attempted to argue for a federal role in post- 
secondaiy education, and the moral obligation of the provinces to spend EPF transfers on
28Donald Savoie, Politics o f Public Spending. (University o f Toronto Press, Toronto, 
1990), pp. 73-80.
^Cameron. More Than an Academic Question, pp.234-238.
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post-secondary education, Ministers o f Finance as early as 1978 began looking at these 
transfers as areas of possible expenditure savings.30 Once again the federal government's 
decision was buttressed by a number o f Task Forces and Reports. The Parliamentary Task 
Force on Fiscal Relations called for equalizing the transfers in EPF, and requiring that "the 
responsible federal ministers must answer in Parliament for the disposition and use of funds 
transferred to provincial governments."31 This led to the requirement that the Secretary of 
State report to Parliament on funds allocated for post-secondary education. Coupled with 
the 1983 decision to limit post-secondary transfers to the "6 and 5" restraint program, the 
EPF transfers had to be split and each portion identified. This was accomplished when the 
deal was re-negotiated in 1984.
The Minister and Department o f Finance appear to be successful in their 
interpretation of what needs to be done regarding the EPF transfers. Contrary to the Minister 
of Human Resources Development's recent Report, there was no exploration of options with 
the provinces to find better ways to spend the money. This was illustrated in the recent 
budget decision to do away with EPF Arrangements and replace them with the Canada 
Health and Social Transfer (CHST). The Minister o f Finance stated that the "restrictions 
attached by the federal government to transfer payments in areas o f  clear provincial 
responsibility should be minimized."32 The CHST will be a lump sum unconditional transfer
30Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, pp. 234-237.
^Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations, Fiscal Federalism in 
Canada, p. 196.
32Canada. Department o f Finance, Budget 1995.(Department o f Supply and Services, 
Ottawa), p. 17.
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that will cover the programs previously covered under EPF and Canada Assistance Plans 
(CAP). Clearly neither the Minister of Finance nor the Prime Minister wish to re-introduce 
a federal purpose to the transfers; rather their major concern appears to be the buzz word for 
the 1990’s, fiscal restraint. The upcoming transfers (they begin in October 1996), are aimed 
at increasing provincial autonomy, reducing inter-govemmental friction, and most 
importantly, controlling the costs to the federal government.
Societal Actors
National Conference^ Canadian Universities (NCCUV Association of Universities and 
Colleges of Canada (AUCC1
The National Conference of Canadian Universities was created in 1911 as an 
organization o f university presidents. Initially, as the title implies, it was an annual 
conference of executive heads held to discuss common problems. With the advent of World 
War II, and the question of funding, a "special relationship" developed between the NCCU 
and the federal government, related to the war effort. This would lead to an increase in 
power and influence of universities and the NCCU at the national level. This is best 
illustrated by the NCCU's role in securing funding for returning veterans in 1945 and its 
successful appeal to the federal government for funding in 1951. The NCCU established its 
Finance Committee in 1951 which met periodically with the Prime Minister to press its case 
for federal support. In addition, it was a NCCU commissioned report (the Bladen Report) 
that called for the appointment of a Minister o f the Crown responsible for education, which 
led to the creation in 1963 of the Education Support Branch within the Department of the 
Secretary o f State.
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The same changes that affected the government and the universities as institutions 
after the Second World War also affected the NCCU/AUCC. It witnessed a rapid growth 
o f its substructure "and the creation of national groups to represent business offices, 
graduate deans, deans o f various faculties, research officers, and the like."33 The NCCU, 
which by 1965 had changed its name to the Association o f Universities and Colleges of 
Canada, (AUCC) considered itself to be the voice o f the entire university community: 
administration, faculty and student.
The special relationship with the federal government changed in the 1970's. One of 
the first indications was the 1974 First Ministers Conference where a Task Force was 
established between the Council of Ministers o f Education, Canada, and the Ministry of State 
for Science and Technology to discuss the direct and indirect cost o f university research. A 
formal structure was established, the Committee on Financing University Research, from 
which the AUCC was noticeably absent. In addition, the association expressed its concerns 
about EPF, the interprovincial mobility o f students, support for programs of national 
importance, and the monitoring o f provincial expenditures. In a 1977 letter to Prime 
Minister Trudeau, the President o f AUCC outlined these concerns and expressed the hope 
"that a forum will develop through which the members o f the AUCC may assist provincial 
and federal authorities in their discussion o f appropriate policies."34 The response was cool,
33Donald C. Savage, "Higher Education Organizations," in Alexander Gregor and Gilles 
Jasmin (eds.) Higher Education, in Canada. (Association for Canadian Studies, for the 
Research and Information on Education Directorate o f the Department o f the Secretary o f 
State o f Canada, 1992), p 30.
34AUCC, Proceedings. 1977, v.2, pp.34-35, as quoted in Cameron. More Than an 
Academic Question, p. 218..
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and designed to keep the AUCC at a distance. The Prime Minister stated that while the 
federal government was interested in the concerns expressed by the AUCC, it would be 
within the framework of the Council o f Ministers of Education, Canada or the Canadian 
Committee on Financing University Research that it would examine them.35 The 1967 
federal-provincial fiscal arrangements had shifted the centre o f gravity or power within this 
sector to the provinces, leaving the AUCC at odds, as its special relationship with the federal 
government quickly evaporated.
By the 1980's the federalization of interest groups was clearly evident in the sector, 
possibly as a result o f the growing provincial dominance. National organizations like the 
AUCC had to adjust and realign themselves. The AUCC accepted the fact that it did not 
represent entire university communities, and reconstructed itself so that it represented the 
university presidents and administrations. Provincial and regional organizations had come 
into existence, the Conference des recteurs et des principaux des universites du Quebec 
(CREPUC), the Council of Ontario Universities in Ontario (COU), the Council of Western 
Canadian University Presidents (COWCUP) in the West, and the Association of Atlantic 
Universities (AAU) in the East. These new organizations contributed to the new structure 
o f  the AUCC, but not to the exclusion o f individual universities.
Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT)
After WWn, not content to be represented by the NCCU/AUCC, university faculty 
formed their own association, the Canadian Association o f University Teachers (CAUT), 
which sought influence as an independent voice o f the university teaching profession at the
35Cameron, More Than an Academic Question, p. 218.
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local and national level. The CAUT saw itself as a professional corporation similar to 
medical and legal associations. The CAUT began challenging the university administration 
to share power and spent a great deal o f energy on internal issues, such as tenure and faculty 
representation on Senate. It also began publishing policy papers on areas of concern to 
faculty. In line with the growth of government activity, the CAUT developed a more 
elaborate organization, for instance it appointed a full-time government liaison officer, which 
reflected the growing importance o f lobbying to the group.36
The faculty organization also faced changes in the 1980's. It first lost its Quebec 
affiliate, then practised sovereignty-association for a few years, and finally amended its 
constitution ensuring a veto in the case o f language and French culture. Here too, federalism 
has left its mark, as there was a growth in provincial organization, which became part of the 
overall structure of the organization.37
Canadian Union of Students/Canadian Federation of Students
The exploding number o f students at a rapidly expanding number o f institutions 
created a situation where many students felt powerless, and decided to organize to do 
something about it. In 1963, the existing National Federation o f Canadian University 
Students transformed itself in the Canadian Union of Students (CUS). CUS originated as 
a collection o f student council presidents which provided a forum for the discussion of 
educational issues.3* For five years CUS along with its parallel organization in Quebec, the
36Pross, Group Politics. (1993), p. 68.
37Savage, "Higher Education Organizations", in Gregor and Jasmin, Higher Education in 
Canada, p. 33.
3*Steven Langdon, "Bissell as High Priest", Saturday Night. Sept. 1971, p. 25.
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Union general des etudiants du Quebec, participated actively in social debates. CUS 
collapsed in 1969, a victim of its own mistrust o f organizational and structural foundations. 
There was still a recognized need for a national organization to represent students, therefore 
students in English speaking Canada formed the National Union of Students, for lobbying 
and representing the general interests o f students, and also the Association of Student 
Councils to provide services such as a travel agency and programmes for students. These two 
groups merged in the early 1980's to form the Canadian Federation of Students which is 
today, the national body for students outside of Quebec. CFS provides a common 
framework within which students can communicate, exchange information, skills and ideas. 
In common with other groups in this sector, CFS has struggled and debated the role of 
provincial student federations within its structure. They have organized along provincial 
lines, with each province having a caucus. There is also within CFS a national branch for 
Graduate Students, as well as corresponding provincial organizations for Graduate Students.
Now that we have identified each group, what about their capacity to affect policy 
decisions? What is their level o f organization, their level of knowledge, and continuity of 
membership? Beginning with the AUCC, it is fairly obvious that in the immediate post-war 
era, the association was extremely successful in affecting policy decisions, and in fact 
participated in some historic decisions not only for post-secondary education, but for the 
history o f social programs and fiscal federalism in Canada.39 It can be argued that the early 
federal involvement in post-secondary education (through agriculture and technical
390ne of the first shared-cost programs involved agricultural education, and the 1959-60 
agreement with Quebec was the first provincial "opting out" of a federal program with 
compensation.
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education), made it easier for the federal government to continue, and expand its 
involvement. This was also precipitated by the involvement of the national associations of 
both university presidents and administrators, as well as faculty.
The AUCC, is an organization with a stable membership, for although the Chair may 
change every few years, membership as a whole and within its committee structure is fairly 
stable. By virtue o f the positions that they hold, its members are highly educated. The 
organization is fairly well structured with a well developed staff and committee system. 
More importantly however, the membership is knowledgable about how government 
operates and which agencies they need to address. It is interesting then to note that a highly 
organized, institutional, knowledge capable group has not been successful in getting its 
agenda adopted.
During lobbying attempts in the 1970's to maintain the 1967 shared-cost funding 
arrangements, rather than the EPF arrangements the Council o f Ontario Universities, one of 
AUCC's provincial members, in a brief presented to the Canadian and Ontario governments, 
acknowledged the ineffectiveness o f the national group. In their brief, the COU stated that 
the universities were very interested in the negotiations, and objected that these negotiations 
had been dominated by the financial officers o f the respective jurisdictions. This, they 
maintained, made it difficult for the voices o f the universities to be heard. In an attempt to 
be included in the negotiations, the brief went on to state that the AUCC had not had 
adequate access to the Canadian Government nor to the group of provincial ministers of
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Education that was becoming increasingly influential.40 While they may have at one time 
been members of the sub-government at the federal level of policy decisions, changes to the 
policy community have moved the AUCC to the periphery of the sub-govemment and into 
the role of attentive public. This is not to say that the government would not or has not 
invited them into participatory role on occasion, but when the major decisions regarding 
funding have been made in the last two decades, the AUCC has not been at the table.
The case is similar for the CAUT. While it has been successful in achieving much 
o f its early agenda within the universities, the CAUT, another well organized, resource rich, 
policy capable group has not been successful in getting what it has been calling for, 
increased funding from the federal government. The CAUT is a member of the attentive 
public, for most major decisions. The occasion may occur where it is consulted on specific 
policy initiatives, but it is predominantly ineffective in achieving its singularly most 
important goal, increased funding. In confirming this reality a lobbyist with one of their 
provincial organizations has admitted recently that considering the current climate of fiscal 
restraint, "lobbying the government is basically useless."41
The CFS is lacking most of Pross's criteria for an institutional group. It does have 
an organizational structure that has some continuity provided by its employees, but the major 
players change yearly, which limits its organizational continuity and cohesion. It also has
‘“’Council of Ontario Universities, Brief to the Canadian and Ontario Governments on the 
Financing o f Higher Education in Canada. (Council o f Ontario Universities, Toronto, 1976), 
p. 3.
41Interview with lobbyist from Ontario Council of University Faculty Associations. 
University o f Windsor, April 1995.
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limited resources for communication or legitimation functions due to its fragmented structure 
and its inability to speak for all students. The principal weakness of the student organization 
is their inability to speak for such a diverse and transient membership. Students as a group 
are not focused, and tend to react to issues that affect them today, giving the organization the 
air of a permanent issue group. The CFS exhibits some o f the characteristics of both issue 
oriented and institutional groups. Also as previously stated, actors in the attentive public 
may be excluded if they are opposed to the general direction o f policy in existence. The CFS 
has made many demands in the past that other actors in the sector consider to be 
unreasonable, which further weakens their participation in the policy community.
There has been a splintering o f the student organizations in the last few years. In 
1992 a number o f Ontario Universities left the CFS and formed a new group, the Ontario 
Undergraduate Student Alliance. While it is not a national body (and the President claims 
it does not aspire to become one) it is in direct competition with CFS for members in 
Ontario. The Graduate Students are also split between the National Graduate Council branch 
of the CFS and another splinter group, the Canadian Graduate Council. There are 15 large 
university student bodies who do not belong to CFS, and many part-time organizations on 
many campuses also are not members of, nor affiliated with CFS. In addition, the national 
organization for part-time students, the Confederation o f Part-time University Students, 
languished for several years, before becoming defunct in 1995. With the student movement 
so fragmented, there is a danger o f being pushed further out o f the realm of influence as 
other actors choose not to have to deal with so many players. Also organizations competing 
for support of an interest have less credibility and may fall victim to the divide and conquer
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strategy.
Strong States/Weak States
Policy communities as an analytical tool are useful because they allow for an 
examination o f the state, therefore any discussion of a policy community must take into 
account the notion of strong and weak states. Michael Atkinson and William Coleman assert 
that in evaluating the weakness and strength at the sectoral level it is critical to determine 
first, the degree to which ultimate decision making power is concentrated, and to what 
degree these individuals or agencies can act autonomously. The state is weak in a given 
sector when authority is dispersed and no one group of officials can take the lead in 
formulating policy. Authority is typically diffused among several bureaux and between 
levels o f government resulting in overlapping jurisdictions.42
Coleman and Skogstad elaborate on this analysis o f state strength. They distinguish 
between state autonomy to act and state capacity to act. Autonomy is exhibited by state 
actors who formulate policy, independently o f societal groups. The ability o f state actors to 
control access by others to the policy network and through this to control the policy agenda 
is an important indicator o f state autonomy. This control over access and the agenda also 
illustrate a state actor's autonomy from other government actors who attempt to enter the 
policy network and seize control o f its agenda. The Department o f Finance would be an 
example o f other such actors. By linking state autonomy to control over access and agenda 
within a sector, the close relationship between the strength o f the state and the strength of
42Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral 
Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies," British Journal o f Political Science. 
(v .19 ,1989), p. 51.
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organized interests is highlighted.43
The capacity of a state to act depends on its ability to design and implement policies 
that meet its objectives. Capacity, like autonomy, is greatly affected by the skill of 
bureaucratic officials, amount o f resources available and the ability to coordinate or 
concentrate the actions o f participants in the policy process. State capacity to co-ordinate 
policy is enhanced when a single agency or bureau dominates a given sector.44
An autonomous state is not necessarily a policy-capable state, nor is a state with 
financial, jurisdictional and bureaucratic capability to execute its own goals and programs 
necessarily willing to do so.4S State capacity and autonomy may not occur together. A state 
agency may have sufficient autonomy to define its own policy goals but lack the capacity 
to design policy instruments or implement policy in the face o f stiff societal opposition. On 
the other hand capable state actors may devise policy initiatives whose successful 
implementation necessitates accommodating sectoral interests.
According to Atkinson and Coleman's definition o f strength, which centres on the 
centralization or dispersal o f authority, the "lead agency" o f the federal government, the 
Secretary o f State (Ministry o f Human Resources Development) in the post-secondary 
education sector is weak. The Secretary o f  State has been assigned the responsibility of 
reporting on federal spending on post-secondary education, as well as the provincial 
expenditures on post-secondary education and intergovernmental meetings between the
43Ibid„ p. 6.
^Coleman and Skogstad, "Policy Communities", p. 16-17.
45WilIiam Coleman and Grace Skogstad, Policy Communities, and Public Policy in 
Canada. (Copp Clark Pitman, Mississauga, 1990), p. 6.
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Secretary of State and the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada. As the primary 
institutional element in post-secondary education policy, the Secretary of State is weak 
because its primary function is the co-ordination o f many programs involving several other 
departments.
While the Secretary of State does possess a high degree of autonomy from societal 
actors, it has been unable to control access to the policy network by other government actors, 
and to consequently control its agenda. The Department of Finance has repeatedly 
"invaded" the sector and dominated the agenda, currently setting the spending on post- 
secondary education. This indicates a lack o f autonomy on the part o f the Secretary of State, 
primarily because federal involvement is precipitated by financial considerations. 
Nonetheless, the dominance o f this sector by finance officials is a situation countenanced by 
the Prime Minister. Around the Cabinet table the Minister o f Finance is outnumbered by 
"spending Ministers1' and could not get acceptance for a budget that slashes federal spending 
in a number o f politically sensitive areas, without the support of the Prime Minister. In 
periods of spending cuts the support o f the prime Minister for the initiatives o f the Minister 
o f Finance has been evident.
Paradoxically, while the Secretary o f State is weak, overall the federal state possesses 
both the autonomy and the capacity to act. This is primarily due to the strong central role 
played by the Department o f Finance. The department is free to formulate policy without 
interference from outside societal actors. Also it has the capacity, and more importantly the 
political will to use this capacity to act. Over the courses o f this thesis we have seen 
examples o f the federal governments unilateral action beginning with the introduction of
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direct grants to the universities, the introduction o f EPF, along with unilateral amendments 
to EPF in 1977, 1982, 1984, 1986 and subsequent budgets, culminating in the decision by 
the current Liberal government to eliminate the EPF arrangements in favour of the Canada 
Social Transfer. The strength of the federal state in this sector is evident if one reviews the 
historical development of its involvement. While it has faced constitutional constraints to 
involvement, it has been able to circumvent these through the use of first its constitutional 
responsibility and later through its spending power. Also, when the federal government has 
chosen to disengage itself from provincial responsibilities, it has successfully and at times 
unilaterally acted in its own best interests. The current Liberal government is continuing the 
pattern set forth by previous Conservative and Liberal governments, concentrating on fiscal 
restraint. The lack o f political will to improve the lot o f Canada's universities is fairly well 
entrenched, due primarily to the problems inherent in the EPF system. The federal 
frustration over the lack o f accountability (both by the provinces, and the universities) as 
well as the absence o f national standards and the hesitancy o f provincial governments to 
discuss any, quite possibly played a role in the federal government decision to cut spending.
While the federal government has no constitutional role to play in education, we have 
discovered in our analysis o f this policy community, that it does indeed play a substantial 
role in post-secondary education, primarily through its financing, but also through its role 
in official language and second language education, student loans and funding o f research.
Our examination o f the actors in the policy community have demonstrated that 
organized, institutionalized groups are not necessarily effective in a state-directed policy 
sector. The AUCC has fallen victim to the shift in power within the post-secondary
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education field, which in part may have been precipitated by the phenomenon of province 
building and the rise of educational bureaucracies in each province. Thus a national body 
would hold less sway in dealing with provincial governments, or with the CMEC. The 
AUCC continues to lobby the federal government for increased federal funding and support, 
both in terms of indirect transfers, and in terms o f increased funding to university research.
The CAUT, similar to the AUCC, has not been successful in achieving its agenda, 
again despite organizational capacity and structure. The CAUT has occasionally joined with 
the AUCC to lobby for similar positions, such as increased funding, but to no avail.
Student groups are the least effective, and in fact border on the issue oriented side 
of the organizational continuum. The fragmentation o f societal groups within this sector, 
into administration, faculty and student organizations, can only aid the federal government's 
position of strength. It faces little concerted effort from the three organizations, who 
frequently want the same result, but seldom co-ordinate their efforts. The student 
organizations are seen as too radical by many in the AUCC and to a lesser degree by some 
in the CAUT to be considered as plausible allies. This fragmentation within the societal 
groups - with each group having a narrow specialized domain representing only a particular 
sub-sector - reflect what Coleman and Skogstad have labelled a "weak associational system". 
Unless there are substantive changes in the direction of federal policies regarding both fiscal 
restraint and decentralization, societal groups in this policy community will continue to have 
their pleas fall on deaf ears.
&&.•
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CONCLUSION
The end of the Second World War, and the return o f veterans began a period of 
dramatic change in Canada. Federal involvement in the post-secondary education sector 
increased as a response to its constitutional commitment to the education of military 
personnel. Other environmental changes encouraged the continued involvement by the 
federal government even after the "veterans bulge" had passed through the system. 
Increased participation rates in general, and especially for women, led to massive increases 
in enrollment that put enormous strain on the ability of universities to operate. The "baby 
boom" continued this trend. Economic justifications for federal involvement included the 
need for a more educated work force to meet the increased technological needs of society. 
Increased federal involvement was then a by-product of wartime centralization and its post­
war legacy, the expansion of the welfare state.
The attitudes and policy stance o f the federal government as it pertains to post- 
secondary education is a good illustration of the ' swing o f the pendulum1 of federalism. 
Involvement increased during a period o f increasing centralization from the 1940’s through 
the mid-sixties. The introduction o f shared-cost agreements in 1967 for post-secondary 
education, signalled a shift to co-operative federalism. Both the 1967 and 1977 rounds of 
fiscal arrangements highlight the need for co-operation on fiscal matters and also illustrate 
the rising importance of executive federalism.
Of equal importance however, is the demonstration of the flexibility of federalism 
in Canada to solve issues o f fiscal federalism (fiscal gap) by circumventing constitutional 
strictures by pragmatic agreement, without recourse to constitutional amendment. In
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addition, it was in the policy field of post-secondary education that asymmetrical federalism 
was first used as a solution to Quebec's unique position and concerns for language and 
culture. As previously stated, language and culture are intimately tied to education, and it 
would have been unreasonable to expect the new nationalists in Quebec to accept direct 
federal involvement in post-secondary education. The 1960 agreement between Lesage and 
Diefenbaker allowing Quebec to "opt out" o f direct grants to its universities, with 
compensation was a 'defining moment1 in the evolution of Canadian federalism.
While co-operation has been a necessary component of fiscal agreements, they have 
in the long run engendered conflict between the federal and provincial governments. The 
provinces objected to federal grants to universities, but were unwilling to substitute 
provincial funding, and therefore they acquiesced. In later years the provincial governments 
objected to the use o f shared-cost agreements, and the use of the federal spending power, 
citing invasion of their autonomy and skewing of their priorities by "fifty-cent dollars". 
Conflict is an ongoing feature o f Canadian federalism and fiscal relations, evident in the 
federal objections to provincial spending o f funds for post-secondary education under the 
EPF agreement. Recent comments from provincial premiers about their distaste for Finance 
Minister Paul Martin's cuts to social spending through the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer, because there was no consultation with the provinces, illustrate that conflict will 
continue to be a feature o f federalism for the foreseeable future.
The recent federal budget merely continues the trend of federal disengagement of 
the federal government from provincial areas o f jurisdiction. This is in line with the general 
shift to decentralization in Canada which began with the 1967 cost-sharing agreement.
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While both the Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Accord were failed attempts at de 
jure decentralization the new Canada Health and Social Transfer is a de facto 
decentralization o f the federation.
An examination of the policy community surrounding federal involvement in post­
secondary education has revealed that changes in the community have a reciprocal effect on 
policy networks. After 1967, there was a shift in power within the policy community as a 
result o f the ascendancy of the provincial governments. While it was not discussed in detail 
in this thesis, the concept o f province building had a major impact on this policy sector, as 
it was one o f the defining reasons for the trend to decentralization. This had a detrimental 
effect on the ability o f the AUCC to continue as a main actor in the community. The federal 
government turned increasingly to the inter-governmental approach, liaising with the CMEC, 
and developing its fiscal responses in house.
What the effect on the AUCC reveals to us is the fact that highly organized, 
institutional groups, with valuable knowledge and skills useful to the government, do not 
necessarily succeed in making their way into the sub-government and having their agenda 
addressed.
The federal government has been backing away from further involvement in post­
secondary education, based on its desire for fiscal restraint and inter-governmental harmony. 
This development will result in policy that benefits governments: their agendas will be met, 
but it does not necessarily result in good policy. There are sound economic and social 
reasons for a national .presence in post-secondary education, including the high mobility 
rates o f educated labour, the economic benefits o f an educated work force, and the high
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technology needs of the national economy as we continue into the "information age". In 
addition, unlike most other OECD countries, the bulk o f Canada's research and development 
is not funded privately but is funded by the federal government through its granting councils 
(see chapter3). While there are economic benefits accrued by an individual obtaining post­
secondary education, the nation as a whole also benefits. In addition, post-secondary 
graduates have lower levels o f unemployment across the country, and are also higher wage 
earners, which means that they ultimately will pay more taxes. Social justifications for 
continued federal involvement include the maintenance o f accessibility for students. 
Decreases in federal funding, combined with most provincial governments embracing the 
philosophy o f fiscal restraint, tuition rates will almost certainly rise. Equality o f funding 
across the provinces is also a factor to be considered.
With a reduction in its funding of social programs, and no earmarking of funds, there 
is no longer a moral argument to be made for the spending o f certain funds to be used for 
post-secondary education. The lump sum super transfer payment to the provinces is-a 
totally unconditional grant. Under the CHST, the five tenets o f the Health Care Act must 
be met, and no residency requirements for social benefits is to be installed, there are no 
minimum requirements for the maintenance o f post-secondary education. This leaves 
universities in Canada in the very unenviable position o f lobbying for funds from the 
provinces, in direct competition with health care and social benefits. In the current era of 
fiscal restraint and concern over the deterioration o f the social safety net, this is not a 
competition that the universities can hope to win.
The rise in executive federalism in Canada, as previously stated has politicized
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issues. It has also meant that issues are discussed at a higher level. There is less discussion 
taking place between bureaucrats with similar concerns and areas of expertise, and more 
going on between actors with much broader scopes such as intergovernmental affairs 
officials and finance officials. This has also contributed to the lack o f effectiveness on the 
part o f interest groups, who do not have the opportunity to develop special links or 
relationships with these departments in a way they would with a lead agency within their 
policy community. This politicization o f issues such as post-secondary education, and the 
propensity to deal with it predominantly through the Department of Finance is truly short­
sighted on the part of the federal government. Aside from the effect it will have on access 
to education to students, it will also have a profound effect on the amount and kinds of 
research, as universities will have to turn increasingly to private industry to fund its research 
facilities. As the level of research and development in Canada is already quite low, funding 
cuts could have an even greater impact here than on access. There is a strong argument to 
be made for a federal presence, indeed a policy on post-secondary education, for without it, 
the university system in Canada, along with social, industrial, agricultural, economic and 
governmental agencies which benefit from the system will suffer.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Atkinson, Michael. (1993). Governing Canada: Institutions and-P.ub.lic Policy. Toronto.
Axelrod, Paul Douglas. (1982). Scholars and Dollars: Politics. Economics, and the 
Universities o f Ontario. 1945-1980. Toronto.
Bakvis, Herman and William M. Chandler (eds.) (1987). Federalism and the Role o f  the 
State. Toronto.
Banting, Keith G. (1987). The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism Montreal.
Boase, Joan P. (1992). Shifting Sands. ..Government-Group Relationships in the Health 
Care Sector. Kingston.
Brooks, Stephen. 1993. Public Policy in Canada. Toronto.
Cairns, Alan C. and Douglas E. Williams. (1988). Constitution. Government, and Society. 
Toronto.
Cameron, David M. (1990). More Than an Academic Question: Universities. Government 
and Public Policy in Canada. Halifax.
Coleman, William and Grace Skogstad. 1990. Policy Communities and Public Policy in 
Canada. Mississauga
Corry, J. A. (1969). Universities and Governments. Toronto.
Courchene, Thomas J. (1979). Refinancing.the Federation. A Survey of the 1977 Fiscal 
Arrangements Act. Toronto.
Courchene, Thomas J. (1984). Equalization Payments: Past. Present and Future. Ontario 
Economic Council, Special Research Report.
Courchene, Thomas J. (1987). Social Policy in the 1990's Agenda for Reform. Toronto. 
C. D. Howe
Cutt, James. 1990. Universities and Government. A Framework for Accountability. 
Institute for Research on Public Policy.
Doem, G. Bruce, Allan M. Maslove, Michael J. Prince. (1988). Public Budgeting in 
Canada: politics, economics and management. Ottawa.
127
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
128
\ \
Doem, G. Bruce, and R.W. Phidd (1992). Canadian Public Policy: Ideas. Structure- 
Process. Scarborough.
Doerr, Audrey D. (1981) The Machinery of Government in Canada. Toronto.
Dye, Thomas. 1975. Understanding Public Policy. New Jersey.
Gregor, Alexander D. and Gilles Jasmin (eds.) (1992). Higher Education in Canada. 
Association for Canadian Studies for the Research and Information on Education 
Directorate of the Department o f the Secretary of State o f Canada.
Horry, Isabelle D. and Michael A. Walker. (1991). Government Spending Facts. 
Vancouver.
Jackson, Robert J. and Doreen Jackson. 1990. Politics in Canada. Culture. Institutions. 
Behaviour and Public Policy. Scarborough.
Krasnick, Mark (ed.) (1986). Fiscal Federalism. Toronto.
Leslie, Peter M. (1987). Federal State. National Economy. Toronto.
Leslie, Peter M. (1980). Canadian Universities 1980 and Bevond: Enrolment. Structural 
Change, and Finance. Ottawa.
Livingston, W.S. 1956. Federalism and Constitutional Change. Oxford.
Lowi, Theodore. 1969. The_End_of Liberalism. Ideology. Policy and the Crisis of Public 
Authority. W.W. Norton and Co. New York.
March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen, (1989). Rediscovering Institutions : The OrganizationaUBasis 
o f Politics. New York.
Pal, Leslie. 1988. State Class andJJureaucracv, Canadian Unemployment Insurance and 
Public Policy, Kingston.
Panitch, Leo.(ed.) (1977). The Candian State: Political Economy and Political Power. 
Toronto.
Pollard, Bruce. (1986). Managing the Interface: Intergovernmental Affairs Agencies in 
Canada, Kingston.
Presthus, Robert. (1973). Elite Accommodation in Canadian. Politics, Toronto.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
129
Pross, A. Paul. 1993. Group Politics and Public Policy. Toronto.
Pross, A. Paul 1986. Group Politics and Public Policy. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Savoie. Donald J. 1990. The Politics o f Public Spending in Canada. Toronto.
Simeon, Richard (1972). Federal-provincial diplomacy: the making o f public policy in 
Canada. Toronto.
Simeon, Richard and Ian Robinson (1990) State. Society and the Development of Canadian 
Federalism, v. 71 Macdonald Commission.
Smiley, Donald V. (1980). Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties (3rd edition) 
Toronto.
 The Federal Condition in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.
Smiley, Donald V. and Ronald V. Watts (1985). Intrastate Federalism in Canada.Toronto
Stevenson, Garth.(ed.) Federalism in Canada. Selected Readings. Toronto.
Stevenson, Garth. (1989). Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unitv. 
(3rd. edition). Toronto: Gage.
Trudeau. Pierre E. (1968). Federalism and the French Canadians. Toronto: Macmillan.
Watts, Ronald L. and Douglas M. Brown. (1991). Options for a New Canada. Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press.
ARTICLES
Atkinson, Michael, M. and William D. Coleman. (1989) "Strong States and Weak States: 
Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies," British Journal of
Bakvis, Herman. (1987). "Alternative Models o f Governance: Federalism,
Consociationalism, and Corporatism," in Bakvis, Herman, and William M. Chandler 
(eds.) Federalism and the Role_of the State. Toronto: University o f Toronto Press.
Bladen Vincent W. et al. 1965. Financing Higher Education in Canada. Toronto.
Boadway, Robin. (1986). "Federal Provincial Transfers in Canada: A Critical Review of 
the Existing Arrangements," in Mark Krasnick, (ed.) Fiscal Federalism. Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press-
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
130
Breton, Albert. (1989). "The Theory o f Competitive Federalism," in Garth Stevenson (ed.) 
Federalism in Canada: Selected Readings. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
Cairns, A.C. and Williams, C. (1985). Constitutionalism, Citizenship , and Society in 
Canada: An overview", in A. C. Cairns and C. Williams (eds.) Constitutionalism. 
Citizenship, and Society in Canada. Toronto: University Toronto Press.
Caims, Alan. 1988. "Citizen (Outsiders) and Government (Insiders) in Constitution Making: 
The Case o f Meech Lake", CanadianPublic Policy. v. 14, Summer supplement.
Cameron, Duncan. (1992). "The Asymmetrical Alternative," in Duncan Cameron and 
Miriam Smith (eds.) Constitutional politics: The Canadian Forum Book on the 
Federal Constitutional Proposals 1991-92. Toronto: James Lorimer & Co.
Careless, Anthony G. (1989). "Limits to Cooperation," in William M. Chandler and 
Christian W. Zollner (eds.) Challenges to Federalism: Policy Making in Canada and 
the Federal Republic o f  Germany. Kingston: Institute o f Intergovernmental 
Relations.
Carter, George E. (1989). "Financing Health and Post-Secondary Education: A New and 
Complex Fiscal Arrangement," in Garth Stevenson (ed.) Federalism in Canada: 
Selected Readings. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc.
Cawson, Alan. (1985). "Varieties o f Corporatism: the importance o f the meso-level of 
interest intermediation," in Alan Cawson (ed.) Organized Interests and the State: 
Studies in Meso-corporatism. London.
Chandler, William M. and Christian W. Zollner. (1989). "Federalism in Canada and West 
Germany: some concluding remarks," in Chandler and Zollner (eds.) Challenges to 
Federalism: Policy-making in Canada, and the Federal Republic o f Germany. 
Kingston: Institute o f Intergovernmental Relations.
Coleman, William and Grace Skogstad, "Policy Comuniti.es and Policy Networks: A 
Structural Approach", in Coleman and Skogstad, (eds). Policy Communities and 
Public Policy in Canada. Mississauga.
Courchene, Thom as! (1991). "Toward the Reintegration o f Social and Economic Policy," 
in Doem, Bruce G. and Bryne B. Purchase (eds.) Canada at Risk? Canadian Public 
Policy in the 1990's. Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute.
Dean, James M. (1986). "Cash Transfer Matter! A Critique o f the Senate Report on 
Postsecondaiy Education," Canadian Journal o f  Higher Education. 17:3, 17-31.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
131
Decore, Anne Marie and Raj S. Pannu. (1986). "Educational Financing in Canada 1970-71 
to 1984-85: Who Calls the Tune, Who Pays the Piper? Canadian Journal of Higher 
Education. 16:2.
Desrosiers, Jean-Yves. (1986). "Postsecondary Education and the Renegotiation of Fiscal 
Arrangements Between the Federal Government and the Provinces." Canadian 
Journal of Higher Education 16:1.
Doem, G. Bruce. (1983). "The Liberals and the Opposition: Ideas, Priorities and the 
Imperatives o f Governing Canada in the 1980's," in Doem, Bruce G. (ed.) in How 
Ottawa Spends. Toronto: James Lorimer and Co.
Dunhamel, Ron. M. P. (1991)."The Federal Role in Education. A Guide to Policy 
Development". January 30, 1991.
Dupre, J.S. (1986) "Reflections on the Workability of Executive Federalism," in R. Simeon 
(ed.) Intergovernmental Relations. Toronto: University o f Toronto Press.
Easton, David. 1957. "An Approach to the Analysis o f Political Systems," World Politics. 
v.9, April 1957.
Fletcher, Frederick J. and Donald C. Wallace. (1986). Federal-Provincial Relations and the 
Making o f Public Policy in Canada: a review of Case Studies," in Richard Simeon 
(ed.) Division of Powers and Public Policy Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Gibbins, Roger. (1987). "Federal Societies, Institutions and Politics," in Herman Bakvis 
and William M. Chandler (eds.) Federalism and the Role of the State. Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press.
Graham, Katharine A. (1991). "Tracking the Second Agenda, Once More With Feeling", in 
Katharine A. Graham (ed.) How Ottawa Spends 1990-1991. Ottawa: Carleton 
University Press.
Grant, John N. (1984). "The Educational Role o f the Federal Government," in Ian 
Winchester (ed.) The Independence of the University and the Funding of the State: 
Essays on Academic Freedom in Canada. Toronto.
Jacek, Henry J. 1991. "Public Policy Analysis and the Impact of Interest Groups: The 
Contributions o f Canadian Political Scientists", Paper presented to the Annual 
Meeting o f the Canadian Political Science Association, June 1991 Kingston.
Johnson, A.W. (1992). "A National Govemment in a Federal State," in Duncan Cameron and 
Miriam White (eds.) Constitutional Politics. Toronto: James Lorimer & Co.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Jordan. Grant. (1990). "Policy Community Realism versus "New" Institutionalism 
Ambiguity," Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Bochum, West Germany, 
April, 1990.
Kapsalis, Constantine. (1982). "Block Funding and Provincial Spending on Social 
Programs". ECC.
Langdon, Steven. "Bissell as High Priest". Saturday Night. Sept. 1971.
Levin, Benjamin. 1990. "Tuition Fees and University Accessibility," Canadian Public 
Policy. 16:1.
Levin, Benjamin and Nancy Sullivan. 1988. "Governments and Universities," Canadian 
Journal o f Higher Education. 18:1.
March, J. G. and Olsen, J.P. (1984) "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in 
Political Life," American Political Science Review. 78, 734-49.
Maslove, Allan M. (1993 ) "Reconstructing Fiscal Federalism," in Frances Abele.(ed.) How 
Ottawa Spends 1992-1993. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
McRoberts. (1993). "Federal Structures and the Policy Process," in Michael Atkinson (ed.) 
Governing Canada Institutions and Public Policy. Toronto: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich Canada Inc.
McRoberts, K. (1986). Unilateralism, bilateralism and Multilateralism: Approaches to 
Canadian Federalism." inR. Simeon fed.t  Intergovernmental Relations. Toronto.
Milne, David. (1991). "Equality or asymmetry: Why choose? in R.L. Watts and D. M. 
Brown (eds.) Options for a New Canada. Toronto: University o f Toronto Press.
National Council on Welfare. Funding Health and Higher Education: Danger Looming. 
National Council o f Welfare, Ottawa, 1991.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Review of National Policies 
fbi£ducation;,-Canada. OECD. 1976.
Painter, Martin. (1991). "Intergovernmental relations in Canada: an Institutional Analysis." 
Canadian Journal o f Political Science. 24:2 (June), 269-88.
Panitch, Leo. 1977. "The Role and Nature o f the Canadian State", in Leo Panitch (ed.) The 
Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power. Toronto.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
133
Pedersen, George. "The Challenge for Universities," in Doem, Bruce G. and Bryne B. 
Purchase (eds.) Canada at Risk?-Canadian Public Policy in the 1990's. C. D. Howe 
Institute, Toronto, 1991.
Pross, A. Paul. (1990). "Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons," in Michael Whittington 
and Glen Williams (eds.) Canadian Politics in the 1990's.
  (1982). "Governing Under Pressure: The Special Interest Groups - Summary of
Discussion" Canadian Public Administration 25:2 (Summer).
Rompkey, Bill. P.C., M.P. "Canada's Need for a National Strategy for Postsecondary 
Education." Canadian Journal o f Higher Education. 16:3,1986.
Savage, Donald C. (19 "Higher Education Organizations", in Gregor and Jasmin (eds.) 
Higher Education in Canada-
Simeon, Richard (1976). "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science. 
9:4 (December).
Richard Simeon. (1987). "The Federal-Provincial Decision-making Process," in R.S. Blair 
and J.T. McLeod (eds) The Canadian Political Tradition. Methuen. Toronto.
Skocpol, Theda. (1985). "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, Bringing the 
State Back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smiley, Donald V. (1988). "An Outsiders Observations of Federal-Provincial Relations 
Among Consenting Adults," in R.D. Oiling and M.W. Westmacott (eds.) 
Perspectives-on Canadian Federalism. Scarborough: Prentice Hall.
Standing Advisory Committee on Funding o f the Association of Universities and Colleges 
o f Canada. (1992V Federal Support for University Educationand Research. Ottawa: 
AUCC.
Stevenson, G. (1977). "Federalism and the Political Economy of the Federal State," in Leo 
Panitch (ed.) The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power. Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press.
Warhurst, John. (1987). "Managing Intergovernmental Relations," in Herman Bakvis and 
William M. Chandler (eds). Federalism and the Role of the State. Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press.
Watts, Ronald L. (1985). "Federal Financing of Postsecondary Education and Research: The 
Johnson Report," Canadian Journal o f Higher Education. 15:2 1985.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
134
Yuk Shing Wu, Terry. (1985). "Federal Contributions to  Postsecondary Education Under 
the Established Programs Financing: Trends and Implications," Canadian Journal 
of Higher Education. 15:1.
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Canada. Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada. 
1985. Report V.2.
Canada. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences. 
1951. Report. Ottawa.
Canada. Department o f Finance. (1995). Budget 1995. Ottawa
Canada. Department o f the Secretary o f State o f  Canada. 1983. Report to Parliament. 
Ottawa.
Canada. Department o f the Secretary o f State o f Canada. (1985). Federal and Provincial 
Support to Post-Secondarv Education in Canada: A Report to Parliament 1984-85. 
Ottawa.
Canada. Department o f the Secretary o f State o f Canada. (1992). Federal and Provincial 
Support to Post-Secondarv Education in Canada: A Report to Parliament 1990-91. 
Ottawa.
Canada. House o f Commons. Debates. 4th Session
Canada. Minister o f Human Resources Development. (1994). Federal and Provincial 
Support to Post-Secondarv Education in Canada. A Report toJarliament 1992-93. 
Ottawa.
Canada. Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements. 1981. Fiscal 
Federalism in Canada. Ottawa.
Canada. (1940). Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. Report. Ottawa.
Canada. Royal Commission on Health Services. (1964) Report.
Canada. Standing Senate Committee on National Finance. 1987. Federal Policy on Post- 
secondarv Education.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
135
OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS
Association of Universities and Colleges o f Canada. Federal Support for University 
Education.
Commission of Inquiry on Canadian University Education.(1991). Report. Ottawa: 
Association o f Universities and Colleges of Canada.
Commission to Study the Development o f Graduate Programmes in Ontario Universities. 
1966 Report. Committee on University Affairs.
Johnson, Albert W. 1985. Giving_Greater Point and Purpose to the Federal Financing of 
Post-Secondarv Education in Canada.
Council o f Ontario Universities. 1976. Brief to. the_Canadian and Ontario Governments on 
the Financing o f Higher Education in Canada. Toronto.
Economic Council of Canada. 1970. First Annual Review: EconQmic_Goals for Canada.
Economic Council o f Canada. 1965. Second Annual Review: Towards Sustained and 
Balanced Economic Growth.
Organization for Economic Development. (1976) Reviews o f National Policies for 
Education: Canada. O.E.C.D.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
VITA AUCTORIS
Patricia Collins was bom in 1958 in Glasgow, Scotland. After immigrating to 
Canada in 1966, she graduated from W.F. Herman Secondary School in Windsor in 1975. 
She returned to school in 1984, studying part-time and earning a double Honours in History 
and Political Science from the University in Windsor in 1992. She continued her education 
at the University o f Windsor, and completed academic requirements for a Master of Arts 
degree in political science in 1995.
136
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
